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I. INTRODUCTION: THE FLORIDA JUICE CASE
Smoke engulfed the generator' as sirens echoed through the Florida
* J.D., University of Florida Levin College of Law; B.A., B.A., Washington & Lee
University. I want to express my appreciation to David G. Owen, Joseph W. Little, Brian C.
Murchison, Tom C.W. Lin, and Sasha Lohn-McDermott for reading and offering comments on
early versions of this Article; Monica L. Wilson, Anne C. McAdams, and Robert W. Davis, Junior
for their comments and suggestions; Paul Pakidis for his research assistance; Dennis A. Calfee and
Lisa Caldwell for their support during the writing of this Article.
1. See, e.g., Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Price, 170 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1964) (per curiam)
(discussing accident involving installation of electrical distribution system by independent
contractor). Portions of this hypothetical are adopted from common law tort actions by
independent contractors' injured employees against premises owners and from Occupational
Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") review commission proceedings against premises
owners or general contractors. This Article cites to several Occupational Safety & Health Review
Commission ("OSHRC") proceedings and subsequent appellate decisions for support. OSHRC
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Juice and Chemical Company's ("Florida Juice") Deland, Florida com-
pound.2 The fire from the accident engulfed Bobby Roberts, an
employee of Independent Electric hired by Florida Juice to clean and
repair its electrical generator. Eventually, the fire was snuffed,3 and the
ambulance, which carried the deceased Bobby Roberts, quietly drove
away.4
Soon after Bobby's death, the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration ("OSHA")' investigated the accident, in which Bobby
fell from Independent Electric's unsecured scaffolding6 while cleaning
and repairing Florida Juice's generator.' Even though Bobby's Indepen-
dent Electric supervisor warned him that the generator was energized,'
Bobby, who lacked protective equipment,' still grabbed the generator's
wires'o to brace his fall," causing his electrocution.12 Dan Alderman, a
Florida Juice plant manager and Independent Electric's contact,
informed the investigator that he visited the worksite the day of the acci-
dent to assess Independent Electric's progress,' 3 but that he did not
proceedings and subsequent appellate court decisions are often cited by courts addressing the use
of OSHA in tort litigation. See, e.g., Teal v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 728 F.2d 799 (6th
Cir. 1984); Horn v. C.L. Osborne Contracting Co., 591 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1979). Multiple times,
this Article cites to tort cases and OSHRC proceedings in the-same footnote; however, it cautions
that tort cases and OSHRC proceedings involve different procedural requirements and other
nuanced differences. For the purpose of this Article, these differences are not dispositive to the
analysis of the Multiemployer Doctrine. As well, for clarity, this Article's evaluation of OSHA's
relevance to state tort actions, in particular Florida's, is limited to the non-construction industry
context.
2. See Jeter v. St. Regis Paper Co., 507 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1975) (discussing accident on
owner's premises involving independent contractor's employee).
3. See Merritt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 875 F.2d. 603 (7th Cir. 1989) (involving injury to
independent contractor's employee during cleaning of electrical equipment).
4. See Lake Parker Mall, Inc. v. Carson, 327 So. 2d 121 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)
(involving death of independent contractor's employee from electric shock).
5. For discussion of the history of OSHA, see infra Part II.A.
6. See Horton v. Gulf Power Co., 401 So. 2d 1384, 1385 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
(involving fall from unsecured scaffolding).
7. See Merritt, 875 F.2d. at 604 (involving injury to independent contractor's employee
during cleaning of electrical equipment).
8. See id. (involving warning of energized electrical system); Lake Parker Mall, Inc., 327
So. 2d at 123-26 (same).
9. See Calloway v. PPG Indus., Inc., 155 F. App'x 450, 452, 455 (11th Cir. 2005) (per
curiam) (discussing lack of fall protection equipment); Pearson v. Harris, 449 So. 2d 339, 340-41
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (discussing duty owed to provide protective equipment).
10. See Lake Parker Mall, Inc., 327 So. 2d 121 (involving death of independent contractor's
employee from electrocution); Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Price, 170 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1964) (per
curiam) (involving electrocution).
11. See Horton, 401 So. 2d at 1385 (involving fall from unsecured scaffolding).
12. See Merritt, 875 F.2d at 604 (involving electric shock during fall).
13. See Skow v. Dep't of Transp., 468 So. 2d 422, 424 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (involving
inspection of progress by owner).
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instruct Independent Electric's workers regarding their work'" or poten-
tial electrical hazards.' 5 Moreover, Alderman emphasized that he did not
notice the hazard because he was unversed in electrical repair.16 Inde-
pendent Electric's contract also did not require Florida Juice to monitor
or correct Independent Electric's safety violations but did require Inde-
pendent Electric to comply with OSHA standards." Based on its investi-
gation, OSHA cited Independent Electric for two violations-the failure
to supply adequate safety equipment'" and proper scaffolding." How-
ever, OSHA did not cite Florida Juice for any violation.
After OSHA's investigation, Bobby's widow discovered that Inde-
pendent Electric did not carry workmen's compensation insurance.20
Therefore, Bobby's estate brought, in Florida's Seventh Judicial Circuit,
a wrongful death action2' against Independent Electric and Florida Juice.
The estate alleged that Florida Juice was an employer under OSHA 22
and therefore owed a duty to provide Bobby with protective equipment
and safe scaffolding." The estate explained that because Florida Juice's
Deland compound was a multiemployer worksite,24 Florida Juice could
14. See id. (involving instructions given by owner); IBP, Inc. v. Herman, 144 F.3d 861 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (involving instruction and recognition of hazards by owner); Turner v. Scott Paper Co.,
No. 94-0284-P-M, 1995 U.S. Dist LEXIS 6768, at *3, *11-*12 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 17, 1995),
adopted by No. 94-0284-P-M, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6769, at *2 (S.D. Ala. May 18, 1995)
(involving right to inspect).
15. See Lowe v. United States, 466 F. Supp. 895 (M.D. Fla. 1979) (discussing owner's duty
when recognizing hazard not created by owner).
16. See Horton, 401 So. 2d at 1387 (Smith, C.J., concurring) (discussing superior
knowledge).
17. See Skow, 468 So. 2d at 424 (discussing independent contractor's contractual requirement
to comply with federal safety standards).
18. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.335 (2011) (stating employees working in areas of potential
electrical hazards are to be provided electrical protective equipment).
19. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.28 (2011) (specifying the safety requirements for safe scaffolding).
20. In Florida, an employer, as defined by § 440.02 of the Florida Statutes, must carry
workmen's compensation insurance to cover damages suffered by an injured employee in the
course of his employment. See generally FLA. STAT. ch. 440 (2012) (setting forth applications and
limitations of "Florida's Workmen's Compensation Law"). Workmen's compensation insurance is
an employee's exclusive remedy, except if the employer does not carry workmen's compensation
insurance. See FLA. STAT. § 440.11 (2012). In such a case, the employer is subject to actions at
law or admiralty. Id.; Elliott v. S.D. Warren Co, 134 F.3d I (1st Cir. 1998); Kane v. J.R. Simplot
Co., 60 F.3d 688 (10th Cir. 1995); see also Tracy Nichols, Comment, Florida Workers'
Compensation: Does Common Employer Concept Unjustly Limit Employees' Claims against
Third-Party Tortfeasors?, 34 FLA. L. REv. 463, 464-66 (1982) (explaining purpose behind
Florida's Workers' Compensation law).
21. See FLA. STAT. §§ 768.16-768.26 (2011) (setting forth the "Florida Wrongful Death
Act").
22. 29 U.S.C. § 652(5) (2006) (stating in pertinent part that "'employer' means a person
engaged in a business affecting commerce who has employees"). For further discussion regarding
OSHA's definition of employer, see infra note 52.
23. For discussion of OSHA's purpose, see infra Part II.A.
24. A "Multiemployer worksite" is a workplace where multiple employers are working in a
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be deemed Bobby's employer under OSHA and thus, owe Bobby a duty
of care.2 5 Moreover, the estate alleged that even if no duty was owed, an
OSHA violation could be used as evidence of negligence by Florida
Juice.26
In light of previous court opinions, the estate's argument is hereto-
fore questionable. 27 In fact, to date, the Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit has not directly addressed in a binding opinion whether
OSHA's Multiemployer Doctrine ("MED") or its Multiemployer Cita-
tion Policy ("MCP") may be used to impose a duty of care on a business
premises owner28 for an independent contractor's injured employee in a
non-construction industry tort action.
The genesis of this quandary-whether the MED or the MCP may
be used as a basis for imposing a duty of care on a business premises
owner-dates back to when OSHA first began to cite employers at mul-
tiemployer construction worksites when those employer's employees
were not the ones exposed to the harm by the employer's violation of
OSHA regulations. At that time, rather than engaging in informal
rulemaking to establish a multiemployer citation scheme, OSHA relied
on interpretations by the Secretary of Labor and holdings by the Occu-
pational Safety & Health Review Commission ("OSHRC") affirming
these citations. As a result, employers have continuously questioned
under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") the validity of the
MED and the MCP scheme. Moreover, an externality of this citation
scheme has been plaintiffs in tort actions using these citations and the
overarching MED to argue that OSHA may be used to impose a duty of
care on a business premises owner with regards to an independent con-
tractor's injured employee or that at the very least, an OSHA violation
may be used as evidence of negligence.
This Article attempts to articulate that because OSHA did not
engage in informal rulemaking to formulate its current MED and MCP,
common undertaking, typically found in the construction industry. See generally John Zebrowski,
Comment, OSHA: Developing Outlines of Liability in Multi-employer Situations, 62 GEO. L.J.
1483 (1974) (discussing multiemployer worksites under OSHA).
25. See Teal v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 728 F.2d 799 (6th Cir. 1984) (involving
argument that premises owner owed duty under OSHA).
26. See Elliott, 134 F.3d at 5 (discussing OSHA violation as evidence of negligence); Merritt
v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 875 F.2d 603, 604-05 (7th Cir. 1989) (same).
27. See lBP, Inc. v. Herman, 144 F.3d 861 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Elliott, 134 F.3d 1; Kane v. J.R.
Simplot Co., 60 F.3d 688 (10th Cir. 1995); Cochran v. Int'l Harvester Co., 408 F. Supp. 598, 602
(W.D. Ky. 1975); Hare v. Fed. Compress & Warehouse Co., 359 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Miss. 1973);
France v. S. Equip. Co. 689 S.E.2d I (W. Va. 2010); Hall v. Dieffenwierth, No. 2-07-058-CV,
2008 WL 2404462 (Tex. Ct. App. June 12, 2008); Vickers v. Hanover Constr. Co., 875 P.2d 832
(Idaho 1994); Tanksley v. Ala. Gas Corp., 568 So. 2d 731 (Ala. 1990).
28. In this Article, "premises owner" means a business premises owner and not a residential
premises owner.
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negative externalities have ensued-an inefficient allocation of
resources and responsibilities between business premises owners and
independent contractors and costly and needless litigation.2 9 As a result,
the MCP, which emphasizes construction situations in its examples and
explanations, and the overarching MED, which traditionally is used in
the construction context, are being employed in non-construction set-
tings, preventing business premises owners from proper notice of its
applicability. 30 This Article further argues that even if OSHA did engage
in proper rulemaking, a greater issue would still exist. That issue is one
of generality versus reasonable specificity. Although one general rule or
regulation for a multiemployer citation scheme would be efficient, this
Article argues that OSHA should revisit its MCP scheme and promul-
gate a more nuanced multiemployer citation scheme, through notice and
comment rulemaking, that tailors the MCP to various industries and
worksites generally. Therefore, with a more nuanced citation scheme, all
parties affected will have greater notice of potential citations and the use
of that potential exposure as a source of potential liability in tort litiga-
tion. This idea is not unprecedented; in the 1980s and 1990s, OSHA
promulgated multiple regulations that specifically addressed multiem-
29. This argument about vagueness is akin to the idea of fair notice; however, this Article
uses the idea in a more general sense. See Gen. Elec. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
("[E]lementary fairness compels clarity in the statements and regulations setting forth the actions
with which the agency expects the public to comply" (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
See generally Timothy A. Wilkins, Regulatory Confusion, Ignorance of Law, and Deference to
Agencies: General Electric Co. v. EPA, 49 SMU L. REV. 156t (1996) (discussing "regulatory
confusion" and the use of the fair notice argument in administrative law cases); Albert C. Lin,
Refining Fair Notice Doctrine: What Notice is Required of Civil Regulations?, 55 BAYLOR L.
REV. 991 (2003) (discussing the fair notice doctrine).
30. See Occ. SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., DEP'T OF LABOR, CPL 02-00-124, OSHA
INSTRUCTION: MULTIEMPLOYER CITATION POLICY (Dec. 10, 1999); see also Citation Guidelines in
Multi-employer Worksites, 41 Fed. Reg. 17639, 17639-40 (proposed Apr. 7, 1976) (emphasizing
construction industry); Gary S. Marx, Note, The Occupation Safety and Health Act of 1970 as
Applied to the Construction Industry: The Multi-employer Worksite Problem, 35 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 173, 191 n.l 16 (1978) (noting that although the Citation Guidelines are not expressly limited
to the construction industry, the limitation seems implied based on the actions of the Secretary of
Labor). Regarding the MED's limited use, one court has even stated, "[t]he duty on one employer
to comply with OSHA standards for the benefit of employees of another employer [in upheld
OSHRC decisions], however, has only been expressly recognized in the multiemployer
construction worksite context." Am. Petroleum Inst. v. Occ. Safety & Health Admin., 581 F.2d
493, 509 (5th Cir. 1978) (emphasis added). American Petroleum is binding precedent in the
Eleventh Circuit, being decided prior to the Fifth Circuit split. See Bonner v. City of Prichard,
Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (adopting Fifth Circuit's body of law as
existed on September 30, 1981 as binding precedent).
Again, this Article's evaluation of OSHA's relevance to state tort actions, in particular
Florida, is limited to the non-construction industry context. For a discussion regarding use of the
MED in construction cases, see generally Marx, supra, at 173 (discussing use of MED in
construction industry violations).
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ployer situations involving certain substances or products.3' However, as
long as the MCP and the overarching MED continue in their current
form, this Article argues that costly litigation and inefficient allocation
of resources will continue as business premises owners incessantly fight
against the use of OSHA in tort proceedings. However, with a clearer
and more precise MED and MCP, American workers will be safer.
Using Florida as a model state, this Article explains why, until
OSHA addresses its MCP and general MED scheme, states should not
use OSHA regulations to impose a duty of care on premises owners,
such as Florida Juice, 32 in tort actions brought by independent contrac-
tors' injured employees. This Article also addresses why, until OSHA
addresses its MCP and general MED scheme, states should not permit
the use of OSHA violations as evidence of negligence. Part II provides a
background on OSHA and the MED and discusses the application of
OSHA regulations and the MED in tort actions to date. Part III chroni-
cles recent challenges to the MED and uses Florida as a model state to
discuss how Florida common law and statutory law regarding hazardous
occupations impose a limited duty of care on business premises owners
absent the MED. Then, Part IV, by using Florida and its previous appli-
cations of OSHA in tort actions as a model state and by revisiting the
Florida Juice hypothetical in light of the prior sections' doctrines, illus-
trates how the MED's broad application causes confusion. Part V con-
cludes by discussing the policy implications of this Article's analysis
and sets forth a charge for regulatory reform.
I. APPLICATION OF OSHA REGULATIONS AND THE MULTIEMPLOYER
DOCTRINE ("MED")
A. Background on OSHA and Multiemployer Doctrine ("MED")
Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 ("Act" or
"OSHA"), Congress attempted "to assure so far as possible every work-
ing man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working condi-
tions" by requiring that: (1) employers "furnish to each of his employees
employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized
hazards that are causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm
to employees" and (2) employers "comply with occupational safety and
health standards promulgated under [the Act]."" To enforce the legisla-
tive intent, Congress empowered the Secretary of Labor, through OSHA,
31. Brief for The Nat'1 Ass'n of Home Builders et al. at 24-27, as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent, Solis v. Summit Contractors, Inc., 558 F.3d 815 (8th Cir. 2009) (No. 07-2191) (citing
various specific regulations involving multiemployer situations that are clearer and narrower).
32. See supra notes 1-26 and accompanying text.
33. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651(b), 654(a) (2006).
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to promulgate by rulemaking standards.34 These promulgated standards
are enforced through inspections by OSHA personnel that take place
prior to an accident during routine visits or during an investigation fol-
lowing a reported accident.35 If OSHA determines a violation is present,
the alleged violator may be subject to civil or criminal penalties; penal-
ties may be appealed to an administrative commission and subsequently
to a United States Court of Appeals.
Under OSHA's Multiemployer Doctrine ("MED"), more than one
employer at a multiemployer worksite may be cited for a hazardous con-
dition. Under the MED, OSHA will cite an employer, regardless of his
common law relationship to the injured, if the employer: (1) creates the
hazard, (2) exposes the injured to the hazard, (3) fails to correct the
hazard when responsible for correcting a hazard, (4) controls the work-
site, or (5) has general supervisory authority over the worksite where the
38injury occurs.
Traditionally, when a premises owner has been sued in a tort action
employing the MED, it is implicitly, if not explicitly, as a controlling
34. See WEX MALONE, MARCUS PLANT & JOSEPH LITTLE, WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND
EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 666 (2d ed. 1980).
35. Id. at 668. OSHA has two major prongs: promulgation of safety standards and inspections
of worksites. For a generalized description of these duties, see Occ. SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN.,
AT-A-GLANCE: OSHA (2011), available at http://www.osha.gov/Publications/3439at-a-glance.
pdf. OSHA's jurisdiction includes: regulating and inspecting private sector employers except for
self-employed, family farm workers, and government workers except in state plan states;
approving and monitoring twenty-seven State Plan states covering private and public employers;
and assisting Federal Agency Programs. See OSHA Enforcement, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, http://
www.osha.gov/dep/index.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2011). For more information about OSHA
inspections, see Occ. SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., OSHA FACT SHEET: OSHA INSPECTIONS,
available at http://www.osha.gov/OshDoc/data GeneralFacts/factsheet-inspections.pdf.
36. MALONE, PLANT & LITrLE, supra note 34, at 668-70; see also Zebrowski, supra note 24,
at 1484-85 (explaining OSHA sanctioning procedures); Earl D. Heath, The Implementation and
Philosophy of the Williams-Steiger Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 25 FLA. L. REV.
249, 249-252 (1973) (detailing the history leading up to the Act and its application). For a
detailed explanation of the citation and appellate process, see Occ. SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN.,
EMPLOYER RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES: FOLLOWING A FEDERAL OSHA INSPECTION (2011),
available at http://www.osha.gov/Publications/osha3000.pdf. The Occupational Safety & Health
Review Commission ("OSHRC"), an independent agency separate from the Department of Labor,
oversees the contest of an OSHA citation. During a contest of an OSHA citation, the initial "trial"
level is a hearing before an administrative law judge ("AL") assigned by the OSHRC. From this
hearing, a party may appeal for a review by the full OSHRC. An OSHRC decision may be
appealed to the Federal circuit court in which the case arose or in the circuit where the employer
maintains its principal office. Id. If the OSHRC does not exercise its discretionary review of the
ALJ decision, the party may appeal directly to the applicable Federal circuit court. About OSHRC,
Occ. SAFETY & HEALTH REV. COMM'N, http://www.oshrc.gov/about/how-oshrc.html (last visited
Nov. 25, 2011).
37. See Occ. SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., DEP'T OF LABOR, CPL 02-00-124, OSHA
INSTRUCTION: MULTIEMPLOYER CITATION POLICY (Dec. 10, 1999).
38. Id.
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employer.39 However, the Multiemployer Citation Policy ("MCP") itself
states that "the extent of the measures that a controlling employer must
take to satisfy its duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent and detect
violations is less than what is required of an employer with respect to
protecting its own employees."'o Further, the MCP is part of OSHA's
Field Inspection Reference Manual and does not have the force or effect
of law.4'
In fact, an Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission
("OSHRC") overruled OSHA's multiemployer-type citation as beyond
its authority the first time OSHA cited an employer for exposing another
employer's employees to a hazardous condition.4 2 OSHA, realizing it
lacked the power to enforce the MED citation scheme, issued a Notice
of Public Comment for a new regulation establishing the MED.4 3 The
Notice, emphasizing the construction industry, was an early version of
the MED citation scheme.44 The Notice was retracted after a subsequent
OSHRC accepted the MED citation scheme.4 5 As this Article will argue,
this retraction was a turning point in the multiemployer citation scheme
that has produced negative externalities, such as costly litigation, ineffi-
cient allocation of resources among business premises owners and inde-
pendent contractors, and general confusion.
Since the initial iterations by OSHA, multiple administrative com-
missions and subsequent appellate courts have adopted OSHA's MED
when imposing a duty of care on a third-party employer for the injury or
death of an independent contractor's employee. 4 6 However, its use, par-
39. See, e.g., Kane v. J.R. Simplot Co., 60 F.3d 688, 694-95 (10th Cir. 1995) (attempting,
under OSHA, to impose duty on owner based on its control of premises when worker fell from
scaffolding).
40. Occ. SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., supra note 30 (emphasis added).
41. See Summit Contractors, Inc. (Summit 1), 23 BNA OSHC 1769 (No. 05-0839, 2006),
2006 OSAHRC LEXIS 33, at * 12, * 17; see also Arthur G. Sapper, The Multi-Employer Doctrine:
End of the Line or a Chance for a Fresh Start ?, OCCUPATIONAL HAZARDS, June 2007, at 15, 16
("[T]he rules that emerge from rulemaking tend to be more realistic and clearer, and enjoy the
perception of greater legitimacy, than those that emerge from litigation.").
42. See Brennan v. Giles & Cotting, Inc., 504 F.2d 1255, 1262 (4th Cir. 1974).
43. Citation Guidelines in Multi-employer Worksites, supra note 30 (proposing regulation to
enforce OSHA violations in multiemployer situations, including when owners have safety
responsibilities for worksite).*
44. See id.
45. See Sapper, supra note 41; Brief for Sec'y of Labor at 11, 12, Solis v. Summit
Contractors, Inc., 558 F.3d 815 (8th Cir. 2009).
46. E.g., McDevitt Street Bovis, Inc., 19 BNA OSHC 1108 (No. 97-1918A, 2000), 2000
OSAHRC LEXIS 89, at *2 (upholding OSHA sanctioning of general contractor when
subcontractor's scaffolding posed hazard, though general contractor's employees were not
exposed); Access Equipment Systems, Inc., 18 BNA OSHC 1718 (No. 95-1449, 1999), 1999
OSAHRC LEXIS 38, at *1-*2 (upholding OSHA sanctioning of scaffolding lessor when
construction site subcontractor injured by the collapse of the scaffolding).
McDevitt and Access represent the MED's traditional application to construction industry
994 [Vol. 66:987
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ticularly in tort actions, is debatable, 7 checkered,4 8 and frequently ques-
tioned.4 9 Further, whether plaintiffs may use OSHA in Florida tort
actions to establish a duty of care is particularly questionable in light of
Florida case law. This Article attempts to bring clarity by explaining that
OSHA's failure to engage in notice and comment rulemaking for its cur-
rent MCP and its precursors is the source for the current confusion. As
well, this Article argues that a proper rulemaking process focused on
precise rules, rather than general rules, will mitigate existing negative
externalities highlighted by the Florida Juice hypothetical.o
This Article emphasizes that the MCP and the MED, generally, in
their current forms, are problematic because of the uncertainty surround-
worksites. This application is logical because OSHA's MCP emphasizes construction situations in
its examples and explanations. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
47. Evidencing the confusion surrounding the use of the MED in tort actions, United States
appellate courts and district courts have been inconsistent in applying the MED, especially in non-
construction tort actions. See Calloway v. PPG Indus., Inc., 155 F. App'x 450, 455 (11th Cir.
2005) (per curiam) (stating that in the Eleventh Circuit, the MED has not been extended to
premises owner when owner is not general contractor); Maddox v. Ford Motor Co., No. 94-4153,
1996 WL 272385, at *3-*4 (6th Cir. May 21, 1996) (stating once no duty established under state
common law, OSHA cannot then create a duty); Melerine v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 659 F.2d
706, 711-12 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981) (refusing to extend duty owed under OSHA beyond
employer's own employees in tort action); Barrera v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 653 F.2d
915, 920 (5th Cir. Unit A Aug. 1981) (stating in tort action against owner by independent
contractor's employee that it is long settled in circuit that "OSHA does not create duties between
employers and invitees, only between employers and their employees" (citations omitted)); Cota
v. Chiplin Enters., Inc., No. 1:04CV297, 2006 WL 2475770, at *3 (D. Vt. Aug. 25, 2006) (holding
on summary judgment that "[t]he short answer is that OSHA does not impose liability on a
property owner when a worker for an independent contractor is injured." (emphasis added)). But
see Teal v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 728 F.2d 799, 804 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding owner
owed duty under OSHA in tort action when furnishing ladder because owner controlled workplace
and had opportunity to comply with OSHA). The Fifth Circuit is the only circuit squarely to reject
the MED. IBP, Inc. v. Herman, 144 F.3d 861, 865 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Since the Fifth Circuit
split, the Eleventh Circuit has yet to address directly the MED. Access Equipment Systems, Inc.,
18 BNA OSHC 1718 (No. 95-1449, 1999), 1999 OSAHRC LEXIS 38, at *31 n.12.
48. IBP, 144 F.3d at 865 n.3 (elaborating how MED "has somewhat of a checkered history"
going through multiple iterations and challenges). As early as 1972, the problem of how to address
multiemployer worksites under OSHA was being debated. See Zebrowski, supra note 24, at 1483.
49. See Summit Contractors, Inc. (Summit II), 21 BNA OSHC 2020 (No. 03-1622, 2007),
2007 OSAHRC LEXIS 34, at *4, *8, *15-*16, *18-*19, vacated, 558 F.3d 815 (8th Cir. 2009),
remanded, 22 BNA OSHC 1777 (No. 03-1622, 2009), 2009 WL 2857148, at *3; see also Summit
Contractors, Inc. (Summit 1), 23 BNA OSHC 1769 (No. 05-0839, 2006), 2006 OSAHRC LEXIS
33, at * 15 (stating that based on Supreme Court precedent, it is "no longer permissible to define
'employer' and 'employee' expansively in order to further the 'purpose' of the statute."); Allstate
Painting & Contracting Co., 21 BNA OSHC 1033, (Nos. 97-1631 and 97-1727HA, 2005), 2005
OSAHRC LEXIS 16, at *4-*6 (explaining that before OSHA may cite an entity as employer,
OSHA must first satisfy Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992)'s
agency test). This Article explains the Darden test further in Part III.B. But see Sec'y of Labor v.
Trinity Indus., Inc., 504 F.3d 397 (3d Cir. 2007) (refusing to extend Summit I's application when
specific OSHA regulation explicitly referenced building owner's liability for asbestos hazards).
50. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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ing whether a business premises owner may or may not be cited by
OSHA, under its broad interpretations of the MCP and MED. This
uncertainty as to a business premises owner's liability spurs the argu-
ment in tort proceedings that the business premises owner may be
deemed an employer under OSHA and therefore owe a duty of care to
comply with OSHA with respect to an independent contractor's
employee. If the MCP were to be promulgated by informal rulemaking
so as to be more nuanced, then all parties involved would have a clearer
idea of potential liability and would plan accordingly.
B. Use of OSHA to Establish a Duty Owed in Tort Actions
Although the Act does not create a private cause of action," OSHA
standards have been used to establish a duty of care in actions by an
independent contractor's employee against a premises owner.5 2 An
example of such use" is Teal v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co.,"
which arguably sets forth the prerequisites for applying the MED to
premises owners in tort. 5
In Teal, the premises owner furnished a defective ladder to an inde-
pendent contractor hired to dismantle and repair hydraulic bailers.5 6
After falling from the ladder, the independent contractor's employee
brought a negligence action against the owner alleging that it breached a
duty of care under OSHA to furnish the employee with safe equipment
and proper safety devices.57 The employee's allegations of fault against
the premises owner implied that the MED applied to his cause of
51. OSHA regulations do not create a private right of action. See Jeter v. St. Regis Paper Co.,
507 F.2d 973, 975 (5th Cir. 1975); MALONE, PLANT & LITTLE, supra note 34, at 670; see also
Minichello v. U.S. Indus., Inc. 756 F.2d 26, 29 (6th Cir. 1985) ("OSHA regulations can never
provide a basis for liability because Congress has specified that they should not.").
52. See, e.g., Teal v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 728 F.2d 799 (6th Cir. 1984). However,
use of OSHA to establish a duty or standard of care has been criticized. See Richard S. Miller, The
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 and the Law of Torts, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
612, 635 (1974) (arguing Act's statutory language, in conjunction with workers' compensation
law, supports the contention that OSHA only applies to direct employers). Miller, however,
limited his assertion, citing an OSHRC commissioner who explained, "[T]he definition of
employer and employee under the Act should be expanded to cover an employer who has the
ability to control the work environment with respect to the hazards affecting the employer's
employees." Id. at 635 n.137. But see Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322-23
(1992) (adopting assumption that where Congress defines employee circuitously, court must infer
Congress intended to describe conventional master-servant relationship understood by common-
law agency doctrine).
53. Cf Kane v. J.R. Simplot Co., 60 F.3d 688, 694-95 (10th Cir. 1995) (relying on Teal test
to find no duty). For discussion of "Teal test," see infra text accompanying notes 61-70.
54. Teal, 728 F.2d at 804.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 801.
57. Id.
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action." Although the owner admitted to violating OSHA,5 9 it argued
that the plaintiff was not within the regulation's protected class.60
Finding for the employee, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit held that under OSHA's specific duty clause,6' "[t]he class of
employers who owe a duty to comply with the OSHA regulations is
defined with reference to control of the workplace 62 and opportunity to
comply with the OSHA regulations."6 3 Therefore, the Teal test states
58. Id. at 803-04.
59. Id. at 803.
60. Id.
61. The "specific duty" clause refers to 29 U.S.C § 654(a) (2006) titled "Duty of Employers
and Employees," which sets out an employer's duty:
(a) Each employer-(l) shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a
place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or
are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees; (2) shall
comply with occupational safety and health standards promulgated under this
chapter.
Section 654(a)(1) is referred to as the "general duty" clause and arises when there is an alleged
serious violation and no standard exists and the specific and stringent requirements of the general
duty definition are met. See Heath, supra note 36, at 251-52. The Secretary of Labor has
interpreted the "general duty" clause to run only to one's own employees and the "specific duty"
clause, § 654(a)(2), to run to all employees that could be exposed on a common worksite. IBP,
Inc. v. Herman, 144 F.3d 861, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
The "specific duty" clause argument is one of two justifications for applying the MED to
premises owners. See Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n (Underhill), 513
F.2d 1032, 1038 (2d Cir. 1975) ("[S]pecific duty to comply with Act is not limited to situations
where violation is linked to exposure of his employees to the hazard."). Proponents of the
expansive interpretation of the specific duty clause argue that because the clause is ambiguous and
lacks limiting language, the court should grant deference to the Secretary of Labor's expansive
interpretation, which "furthers rather than frustrates the policy underlying the Act." See Universal
Constr. Co. v. Occupational Health & Safety Review Comm'n, 182 F.3d 726, 729-30 (10th Cir.
1999). For discussion of the policy underlying the Act, see supra Part II.A.
However, Brennan's interpretation of the clause has been distinguished to state that OSHA is
limited to exposure by the violating employer or those engaged in a common undertaking and
excludes a third party or passerby. United States v. Pitt Des Moines, Inc., 168 F.3d 976, 985 (7th
Cir. 1999).
62. Teal's emphasis on the workplace is consistent with the second justification for the MED,
the legislative intent argument. See, e.g., Universal Constr. Co., 182 F.3d at 728, 730 (upholding
OSHA citation against construction site's general contractor for subcontractor's violation based on
specific duty clause and legislative intent of OSHA). The legislative intent argument focuses on
the premises. See Brennan, 513 F.2d at 1038. The basis for the legislative intent argument is that
"death and disability prevention" is the principal objective of the Act. H.R. REP. No. 91-1291, at
23 (1970), reprinted in 6 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ACT,
1970, at 853; see also MALONE, PLANr & LITTLE, supra note 34, at 666 (discussing OSHA's
purpose as preventing industrial accidents). Brennan illustrates the application of this principle,
reasoning that "it was the intention of Congress to encourage reduction of safety hazards to
employees 'at their places of employment.'"513 F.2d at 1038-39 (citations omitted). Therefore,
even if the contractor's own employees were not exposed to a hazard, someone's employee was
exposed to a hazard at his place of employment, thus making OSHA applicable. Id.
63. This will henceforth be referred to as the "Teal test." Teal, 728 F.2d at 804 (emphasis
added). But see Davenport v. Summit Contractors, Inc., 612 S.E.2d 239, 243 n.8 (Va. Ct. App.
2005) (explaining courts upholding the MED against general contractors "overlook the fact that,
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that for OSHA to be applicable, an independent contractor's injured
employee must establish that: (1) the owner controlled the workplace
and (2) the owner had an opportunity to comply with OSHA regula-
tions.64 Many courts overlook these prerequisites.65
Under OSHA, to control the worksite means to determine the man-
ner in which the work is to be done. 6 6 This is consistent with the com-
mon law definition of control, which is used to determine whether a
worker is an employee or an independent contractor.67 Therefore, the
control factor under the Teal test is actually asking whether the owner,
by exercising control, destroyed the independent contractor relation-
ship.68 Thus, viewing Teal from this perspective, even if an owner such
as Florida Juice" violates OSHA standards, the owner would not be
subject to the MED as long as the owner does not exercise such a degree
of control as to destroy the independent contractor relationship.70 How-
ever, because the MED and the MCP are applied so broadly, this limita-
tion is not a definitive one and may possibly be read out by a court
interpreting OSHA's broad MED and citation scheme; thus, creating
greater uncertainty among participants at multiemployer worksites.
In fact, in Ellis v. Chase Communications, Inc., the Sixth Circuit
distinguished Teal: finding that Teal applies when an OSHA violation
may be conclusive evidence of negligence but also finding that Teal
does not allow conversion of an OSHA violation into a private cause of
action by an independent contractor's employee against a premises
owner." This intra-circuit confusion demonstrates the uncertainty sur-
in their cases, the party held liable actually created the worksite hazard, e.g., Teal, 728 F.2d at
801, Brennan, 513 F.2d at 1039.").
64. Teal, 728 F.2d at 804. Arguably, Teal involves more than an employer creating the
hazard.
65. See, e.g., Access Equipment Systems, Inc., 18 BNA OSHC 1718 (No. 95-1449, 1999),
1999 OSAHRC LEXIS 38, at *23-*31 (upholding scaffolding lessor's OSHA violation citation
when construction subcontractor was injured when the scaffolding collapsed).
66. See Occ. SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., supra note 30 (a controlling employer is "an
employer who has general supervisory authority over the worksite.").
67. See, e.g., Cantor v. Cochran, 184 So. 2d 173, 174-75 (Fla. 1966) (listing control as factor
in determining whether independent contractor relationship destroyed); see also infra note 185
(discussing Florida law regarding employer-independent contractor relationship).
68. See, e.g., Cantor, 184 So. 2d at 174-75; see also infra note 185 (discussing Florida law
regarding employer-independent contractor relationship).
69. See supra Part I.
70. See Trowell v. Brunswick Pulp and Paper Co., 522 F. Supp. 782, 784 (D.S.C. 1981)
(stating that OSHA does not create a duty of compliance with OSHA standards for a non-
employee's benefit); see also Schwab v. United States, 649 F. Supp. 1319, 1330 (M.D. Fla. 1986)
("[A]s a general rule, 'there is no common law duty on the part of an owner to provide a safe place
to work for employees of contractors engaged in the performance of work on the owner's
premises.' The exception to this maxim is where an owner or general contractor actively
supervises daily operations." (internal citations omitted)).
71. Ellis v. Chase Commc'ns, Inc., 63 F.3d 473, 477-78 (6th Cir. 1995). But See Ellis, 63
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rounding the use of OSHA in tort litigation, which results from the MED
and its citation scheme being so broad due to its lack of notice and com-
ment rulemaking.
For example, notwithstanding Ellis' limitation of Teal, business
premises owners are still exposed to potential liability for the injuries to
independent contractors' employees by the Teal court's reliance on the
control factor and the subsequent interpretations of the MED and MCP
by Occupational Safety & Health Review Commissions ("OSHRCs")
and the appellate courts. As well, the control factor in Teal that this
Article highlights may still be determinative regardless of Teal's future
applicability because if the premises owner exercises sufficient control
over the worksite, it vitiates the independent contractor relationship and
thus owes a duty under the common law. Thus, OSHA would not be
creating a new duty that did not exist under the common law nor would
it be expanding an existing duty under the common law.72
However, the control factor in Teal was never fully addressed
because the owner conceded that it owed a duty to comply with the
OSHA regulations." The control factor's importance, however, is
clearer in IBP, Inc. v. Herman,74 in which the court ruled in favor of the
owner because the owner lacked the requisite control." Moreover, illus-
trating how control remains the determinative factor, courts have held
that, absent control, there is no duty owed by an owner even when it
knows the independent contractor's method of repair, it inspects the pro-
F.3d at 478, 483 (Wellford, J., concurring) (noting that the majority failed to reconcile the Sixth
Circuit case law of Teal and Minichello v. United States Industries, Inc., 756 F.2d 26 (6th Cir.
1985), and that the concurring judge would limit Teal to its facts).
72. 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (2006) states:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to supersede or in any manner affect any
workmen's compensation law or to enlarge or diminish or affect in any other
manner the common law or statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of employers and
employees under any law with respect to injuries, diseases, or death of employees
arising out of, or in the course of, employment.
73. Teal v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 728 F.2d 799, 805 (6th Cir. 1984).
74. 144 F.3d 861, 865-66 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (involving a commission proceeding against
premises owner who hired independent contractor); see also Kane v. J.R. Simplot Co., 60 F.3d
688, 694-95 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating OSHA's specific duty clause does not apply to owner when
independent contractor is hired and employer has no control over worksite); France v. S. Equip.
Co., 689 S.E.2d 1, 15 (W. Va. 2010) ("Courts appear to be nearly unanimous in holding that the
owner of premises on which work is being done-whether by one contractor or by more than one
independent contractor-is not a responsible 'employer' under OSHA" and citing various cases to
support argument that where owner lacked control and limited inspections to those ensuring
compliance with the contract, no duty was owed).
75. IBP, 144 F.3d at 865-66. But see Barrera v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 653 F.2d
915, 920-21 (5th Cir. Unit A Aug. 1981) (stating that "OSHA does not create duties between
employers and [independent contractor's employees], only between employers and their
employees" but finding for worker because owner committed an affirmative act of negligence).
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gress of the job,76 or it retains the right to ensure its independent con-
tractor's compliance with OSHA standards. 7 Thus, until OSHA
addresses its MED and current MCP, scholars and courts, before using
OSHA to establish a duty of care or before using an OSHA violation as
evidence of negligence, should read Teal and similar cases with a focus
towards whether the owner exercised the requisite control over the inde-
pendent contractor.
C. Use of OSHA Violation as Evidence of Negligence
While Teal interprets OSHA to construct its test for imposing a
duty on an owner for an independent contractor's injured employee,7"
other courts, avoiding a broad reading of OSHA, permit proof of an
OSHA violation 79 only as evidence of negligence.so In Elliott v. S.D.
Warren Co., the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, citing sister
courts, explained that because OSHA does not create a private right of
action, a violation of an OSHA regulation can never be equated with
negligence per se.8 ' Further, according to Elliott, an OSHA regulation is
at best the equivalent of a safety statute-violation of which is merely
76. See Calloway v. PPG Indus., Inc., 155 F. App'x 450, 452, 455 (11th Cir. 2005) (per
curiam) (holding no duty owed by owner to independent contractor's employee who fell from
rafters while installing a water line); Kaczmarek v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 884 F. Supp. 768, 778
(W.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding owner owed no duty to independent contractor's employee for
ammonia gas exposure during repair because owner lacked requisite control).
77. See Calloway, 155 F. App'x at 453, 455.
78. Teal, 728 F.2d at 804.
79. In this Article, "proof of an OSHA violation," means to prove a violation under tort
standards. Multiple courts have ruled that an OSHA citation, itself, cannot be used as evidence of
negligence in a tort action. See, e.g., Minichello v. U.S. Indus., 756 F.2d 26, 30 (6th Cir. 1985);
Miller, supra note 52, at 633.
80. Elliott v. S.D. Warren Co., 134 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1998) (permitting OSHA violation as
evidence of negligence in an action by subcontractor's employee against mill owner for injury
incurred while constructing mill); see also Rabon v. Automatic Fasteners, Inc., 672 F.2d 1231,
1238-39 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (permitting the use of OSHA violation as evidence of negligence;
however, questioning whether OSHA regulations are even relevant in a claim against a non-
employer but not reaching the question because it was not raised). Rabon is Eleventh Circuit
precedent. See infra note 166-67 (discussing the Eleventh Circuit's adoption of Fifth Circuit case
law).
However, compliance with OSHA standards cannot be used as evidence to absolve oneself of
negligence. See Minichello, 756 F.2d at 30 (holding that in addition to OSHA standards not
altering the civil rule of liability, compliance with OSHA standards cannot be used to absolve
oneself from product liability action). But see Martin v. MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline, Inc., 866 F.
Supp. 1304, 1307-08 (D. Kan. 1994) (analogizing from OSHA admissibility cases, which held
OSHA violation as not being conclusive proof of negligence or the absence of negligence, when
admitting compliance with state safety standard as non-conclusive evidence of the absence of
negligence).
81. Elliott, 134 F.3d at 4.
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evidence of negligence.8 2 Elaborating further," other courts have ruled
that prior to admitting an OSHA violation as evidence of negligence, the
court must first find that the owner owed the worker a duty under state
law.8 4 If no duty is owed under state law, then an OSHA violation can-
not be used as evidence of negligence."
While some courts permit the admission of an OSHA violation as
evidence of negligence in actions against a premises owner,8 6 other
courts have held that OSHA and similar private standards8 7 cannot even
be admitted." In Merritt v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation., the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit explained that even if OSHA and pri-
vate standards" applied to the owner in an action by an independent
contractor's employee, "the regulations could not be used to expand or
otherwise affect [the owner's] common law duties or liabilities under a
negligence per se theory, or as evidence of an expanded standard of
care."90 Merritt further elaborated that to consider an owner to be an
employer under OSHA would be inconsistent because the same owner
would not be afforded a similar status under state workmen's compensa-
tion laws. 9' Furthermore, contrary to criticism,92 multiple courts have
82. Id. at 5 (applying Maine law).
83. Id.; see McCarthy v. Weathervane Seafoods, No. 10-cv-395-JD, 2011 WL 2174036, at *6
(D.N.H. June 1, 2011) (limiting Elliott as not allowing OSHA to be used to establish a basis for
negligence per se claim).
84. Rollick v. Collins Pine Co., 975 F.2d 1009, 1014 (3d Cir. 1992).
85. Cf id. at 1014 (admitting OSHA as evidence of a standard of care after determining that a
duty was owed under state law).
86. E.g., Elliott, 134 F.3d at 5.
87. Private standards include National Electric Safety Code or National Electric Code. See,
e.g., Merritt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 875 F.2d 603, 608 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding private
standards inadmissible as evidence of negligence in action against an owner by independent
contractor's employee who was electrocuted during a fall).
88. See, e.g., id. at 604-05 (holding OSHA violation inadmissible as evidence of negligence
in action against owner by independent contractor's employee who was electrocuted during fall).
But see Wendland v. AdobeAir, Inc., 221 P.3d 390, 395, 395 n.8 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009) (citing
cases providing that OSHA rules may be relevant to establishing an applicable standard of care in
a tort action).
89. See supra note 87.
90. Merritt, 875 F.2d at 604-05, 608 (citations omitted). Merritt went onto to explain that
even as evidence of negligence, there was no question for a jury since the owner satisfied his duty
by warning that the lines were energized. Id. at 605.
91. Id. at 608-09. In fact, if one of the owner's own workers performed the act, the worker
would have no additional compensation under common law. Id. Merritt also cited the superior
knowledge of the independent contractor as a reason for not extending OSHA to the premises
owner. Id. at 605 ("Where an invitee is possessing of knowledge equal or superior to that of the
landowner of the hazard causing the injury, the landowner is relieved of any duty which might
have otherwise been imposed." (citation omitted)); see also Trowell v. Brunswick Pulp and Paper
Co., 522 F. Supp 782, 784 (D.S.C. 1981) (stating owner cannot be held to a higher standard of
care than common law and that the admission of an OSHA violation is highly prejudicial).
92. See generally Nichols, supra note 20 (arguing workmen's compensation insurance may
enrich third-parties unjustly).
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concurred with Merritt93 and held that the owners do not escape liability
under workmen's compensation laws because they pay premiums for the
independent contractor's workmen's compensation coverage.9 4 There-
fore, to hold the owner liable for the injury to an independent contrac-
tor's employee would mean to subject the owner to greater liability and
expense than if the owner hired his own employee to perform the
work.95 However, workers like Bobby in the Florida Juice hypothetical,
who work for uninsured independent contractors, may be without
recourse absent a state safety net. Because of a lack of proper notice and
comment rulemaking, OSHA's MED and its citation scheme do not
account for this potential impact on the cost allocation between employ-
ers and independent contractors and the possible effects on workmen's
compensation scenarios like Bobby's.
III. QUESTIONING AND REJECTION OF THE MULTIEMPLOYER
DOCTRINE (MED)
While Merritt96 and other courts9 7 refused to extend the use of
OSHA to establish evidence of negligence, other courts simply rejected
OSHA's MED 8 or the MED's underlying rationale. 99 In the past dec-
ade, Occupational Safety & Health Review Commissions
("OSHRCs")" and Congress'o' have criticized the MED. The follow-
93. Merritt, 875 F.2d at 608-09.
94. New Mexico Elec. Serv. Co. v. Montanez, 551 P.2d 634, 637-38 (N.M. 1976).
95. Id. The court added that the employer generally hires an independent contractor to
perform work that the owner is not equipped or trained to do. Id. However, again, if the owner
was actually negligent, the owner would be liable based on a breach of a common law duty to
commit no harm against another.
96. Merritt, 875 F.2d at 608-09.
97. See, e.g., Trowell v. Brunswick Pulp and Paper Co., 522 F. Supp. 782, 784 (D.S.C. 1981)
(admitting OSHA violations would have a prejudicial effect).
98. E.g., Melerine v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 659 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981).
99. E.g., Summit Contractors, Inc. (Summit I), 23 BNA OSHC 1769 (No. 05-0839, 2006),
2006 OSAHRC LEXIS 33, at * 15 n.2 (explaining that the legal foundation for multiemployer
liability has been swept away by Darden). For discussion of Darden, see infra Part III.A.
100. See Summit Contractors, Inc. (Summit II), 21 BNA OSHC 2020 (No. 03-1622, 2007),
2007 OSAHRC LEXIS 34, at *8-*16, vacated, 558 F.3d 815 (8th Cir. 2009), remanded, 22 BNA
OSHC 1777 (No. 03-1622, 2009), 2009 WL 2857148, at *3.
101. During the writing of this Article, Congress was debating legislation that would have
strengthened OSHA's enforcement powers and reach. See Protecting America's Worker Act, S.
1166, 112th Cong. (2011). Although, at the time of publication, Congress has not voted on this
legislation, Congress may still propose similar legislation in the next session as it has done in past
ones. See Press Release, U.S. Senator Patty Murray, Murray Introduces Major Legislation to
Protect Workers Across America (June 9, 2011), available at http://murray.senate.gov/public/
index.cfmI2011/6/murray-introduces-major-legislation-to-protect-workers-across-america
(announcing that Senator Murray, Chairwoman of the Health, Education, Labor, & Pensions
Subcommittee on Employment and Workplace Safety, is currently calling for more effective
OSHA penalties to protect workers).
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ing sections focus on three cases that influenced the current analysis of
OSHA's MED and illustrate how one state has approached the business
premises owner situation, absent OSHA's MED.
A. The Issue of the Ambiguously-Defined Employer
In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden,10 2 the United
States Supreme Court addressed whether an individual was an employee
or independent contractor under the Employment Retirement Income
Security Act ("ERISA").os In its ruling, the Court adopted the assump-
tion that where Congress defines an employee circuitously, the court
must infer that Congress intended to describe the conventional master-
servant relationship understood by the common-law agency doctrine.' 0 4
Therefore, an individual's employment status would be determined by
the adopted Darden test.o0
Since Darden, OSHRCs have applied the Darden test rather than
the MED to determine if an individual is an employee because, similar
to ERISA, the OSH Act circuitously defines employeeo' and
employer.'0 7 For example, in Allstate Painting and Contracting, Inc., 0 8
a commission stated that before an entity is cited as an employer, the
Secretary of Labor must first satisfy the Darden test rather than simply
prove whether the entity had control over the person.' 09 Later, in Summit
Contractors, Inc. (Summit I),"I0 an OSHRC stated that the Darden test
must be applied because the "multi-employer citation policy . . . cannot
102. 503 U.S. 318 (1992).
103. Id. at 319-21.
104. Id. at 322-23. The Court's holding was based on a similarly vague definition of employee
in a case involving the Copyright Act of 1976. Id.
105. Id. at 323-24 (setting forth the Darden test).
106. 29 U.S.C. § 652(6) (2006) ("'[E]mployee' means a person of an employer who is
employed in a business of his employer which affects commerce.").
107. 29 U.S.C. § 652(5) (2006) (stating in pertinent part, "'[E]mployer' means a person
engaged in a business affecting commerce who has employees . . . ."). For further discussion
regarding OSHA's definition of employer, see supra Part II.A & note 52.
For application of the Darden test to OSHA, see Summit Contractors, Inc. (Summit 1), 23
BNA OSHC 1769 (No. 05-0839, 2006), 2006 OSAHRC LEXIS 33, at *11-* 16. But see Sec'y of
Labor v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 504 F.3d 397, 402 (3d Cir. 2007) (limiting Darden to ERISA but
stating OSHA asbestos regulation at issue specifically addressed premises owner's duty);
Katherine V.W. Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical Employees: Employment Law for Workers
without Workplaces and Employees without Employers, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 251,
260-61 (2006) (stating that "[t]he Supreme Court has not yet directly ruled on what the definition
of an employment relationship is under OSHA," but emphasizing OSHRCs have explicitly stated
that they will follow Darden).
108. Allstate Painting and Contracting Co., 21 BNA OSHC 1033 (Nos. 97-1631 and 97-1727,
2005), 2005 OSAHRC LEXIS 16.
109. Id. at *4-*6.
110. Summit 1, 23 BNA OSHC 1769, 2006 OSAHRC LEXIS 33; see also AAA Delivery
Servs., Inc., 21 BNA OSHC 1577 (No. 02-0923, 2006), 2006 OSAHRC LEXIS 14, at *10-*13
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confer authority to cite [a general contractor] . . . . It is well settled that
the [MCP as a part of the Field Inspection Reference Manual] does not
have the force or effect of law.""' Thus, if the MCP is a defective citing
mechanism, the use of an OSHA citation or potential citation to estab-
lish a duty of care on a business premises owner or the use of an OSHA
citation or potential citation as evidence of negligence presents a quan-
dary that cannot be resolved without proper notice and comment
rulemaking. Summit I further emphasized that after Darden, employer
and employee could no longer be defined expansively based on the leg-
islative intent of the Act,' l2 but rather must be defined by the traditional
"common-law sense."" 3 Therefore, based on Darden and Summit I, if
the MED cannot define who is an employer in OSHRC proceedings,
then it is questionable whether OSHA can define who is an employer in
tort actions. This uncertainty of who is an employer under OSHA's
MED is at the crux of the negative externalities of the current MED and
multiemployer citation scheme.
B. A Circuit Court's Missed Opportunity to Confront OSHA's
Ambiguous Employer and Determine the Legality of MCP
I. THE DEBATE REGARDING DARDEN's APPLICABILITY
In Summit Contractors, Inc. (Summit II),l an OSHRC held that
the MED could not be used to sanction a controlling employer"' for
failing to ensure that other employers comply with safety and health
standards when the controlling employer neither created the alleged haz-
ard nor had employees exposed to the alleged hazard." 6
Reviewing on appeal the OSHRC's holding, the Eighth Circuit
(applying Darden test to determine employment relationship). But see Trinity Indus., Inc., 504
F.3d at 402.
Ill. Summit I, 23 BNA OSHC 1769, 2006 OSAHRC LEXIS 33, at *12.
112. Id. To further the purpose of the statute is one of OSHA's major arguments for expanding
the MED's definition of employer. See supra notes 61-62.
113. Summit I, 23 BNA OSHC 1769, 2006 OSAHRC LEXIS 33, at *15, *15 n.2 (explaining
that legal foundation for multiemployer liability has been swept away by Darden). But see
Summit Contractors, Inc., 23 BNA OSHC 1196 (No. 05-0839, 2010), 2010 WL 3341872, at
*7-*9 (acknowledging that Darden is used to determine whether "the cited entity has any
employees" when statutory applicability is in question and to determine whether a "particular
statutory employer has an employment relationship with a particular worker," but claiming that
these Darden-relevant inquiries were irrelevant to a multi-employer construction worksite case in
which the "lack of an employment relationship is presumed.").
114. Summit Contractors, Inc. (Summit II), 21 BNA OSHC 2020 (No. 03-1622, 2007), 2007
OSAHRC LEXIS 34, at *1, *2-*4 (involving sanctions against general contractor for
subcontractor's violations).
115. The term, controlling employer, comes from OSHA's Multiemployer Citation Policy. See
Occ. SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., supra note 30.
116. Summit II, 21 BNA OSHC 2020, 2007 OSAHRC LEXIS 34, at *4-*5.
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addressed the argument of whether the MCP provides a more expansive
definition of employer and employee than permitted by Supreme Court
precedent, Nationwide Mutual Insurance v. Darden.'" The Supreme
Court held in Darden that if Congress leaves the definition of
"employee" unclear, then the courts should construe the term according
to common law agency doctrine."' The court explained that previous
OSHRCs premised the MCP on 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(2), the specific duty
clause, which "does not base an employer's liability on the existence of
an employer-employee relationship."" However, the court relied heav-
ily on its own circuit precedent for this finding. Thus, its conclusion
should be limited to the Eighth Circuit because its rationale for support-
ing the current multiemployer citation scheme is questionable under
Darden and the case facts of Summit.120
Subsequent to the Eighth Circuit ruling, a later OSHRC addressed,
inter alia, whether Darden precluded the imposition of the OSHA in the
multiemployer context.12 ' The majority of the commission acknowl-
edged that Darden is used to determine whether "the cited entity has any
employees" when statutory applicability is questioned and is used to
determine whether a "particular statutory employer has an employment
relationship with a particular worker.12 2 However, the majority claimed
that these Darden-relevant inquiries were irrelevant to a multiemployer
construction worksite case in which the "lack of an employment rela-
tionship is presumed." As a basis for this conclusion, the majority also
relies on the specific duty clause of the Act.'2 3
However, this expansive reasoning may be limited to the facts of
the case. First, the citation occurred in the construction context and the
majority used the construction context as a reason for not applying
Darden. Therefore, Darden may still be applicable when determining
the employer in a multiemployer situation involving a premises owner in
a non-construction context.
The dissenting commissioner in this commission proceeding
explained in detail the perceived errors in the majority's reasoning with
117. Solis v. Summit Contractors, Inc., 558 F.3d 815, 827-28 (8th Cir. 2009); see also infra
Part Il.A (discussing Darden); supra Part II.A (discussing why the MCP is relevant to this
Article's analysis of a business premises owner's tort liability).
118. 558 F.3d at 827.
119. Id. at 828.
120. Id. (citing Marshall v. Knutson Constr. Co., 566 F.2d 596, 599 (8th Cir.1977)). However,
the dissent questions whether Knutson is binding precedent in the circuit. See id. at 829 n.8
(Beam, J., dissenting).
121. Summit Contractors, Inc., 21 BNA OSHC 1196 (No. 05-0839, 2010), 2010 WL 3341872,
at *2.
122. Id. at *8.
123. Id.
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respect to its interpretation of the MCP and Darden. Elaborating, the
dissenting commissioner explained that the Darden Court expressly
rejected the rationale used by the majority to justify the MCP-i.e., that
the MCP and its expansive definition of the employer-employee rela-
tionship achieve the Act's remedial objective. 124 Moreover, the dissent-
ing commissioner noted that the conflict between the MCP and the Act
has yet to be addressed by the Eleventh Circuit. Specifically, the com-
missioner explained how the MCP contradicts § 4(b)(4).125 As well, to
further his reasoning that the Act did not intend an expansive definition
of employer, the dissenting commissioner cites to failed proposed legis-
lation in the 1990s that sought to amend the Act in order to make general
contractors responsible for subcontractors' violations.126 Finally, the dis-
senting commissioner noted previous court opinions citing how Darden
contradicts OSHA's attempts to justify the MCP and how the commis-
sion has previously adopted Darden, explaining that under Darden, it is
not enough that the employer controls the overall worksite; instead, the
employer must control the workers.' 27
Second, in Summit, the cited employer's employees were exercising
"overall authority regarding safety related matters at the worksite;" situ-
ations like Florida Juice are the polar opposite. In fact, the OSHRC pre-
viously addressed a similar issue in Sasser Electric & Manufacturing
Company, a case involving a violation by a subcontractor at a premises
owner's property. The commission concluded that absent the exercise of
control by the owner, "when some of the work is performed by a spe-
cialist, an employer is justified in relying upon the specialist to protect
against hazards related to the specialist's expertise so long as . . . reli-
ance is reasonable and the [owner] has no reason to foresee that the
work will be performed unsafely." 28 Moreover, the Sasser commission
elaborated that "it is natural for an employer to rely upon the specialist
to perform work related to that specialty safely in accordance with
OSHA standards." 2 9 Therefore, in light of these unresolved issues,
124. Id. at *12 (Commissioner Thompson, dissenting).
125. Id. at *14; see also infra Part 11I.C (making a similar argument regarding 29 U.S.C.
§ 653(b)(4)). 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (2006) states:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to supersede or in any manner affect any
workmen's compensation law or to enlarge or diminish or affect in any other
manner the common law or statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of employers and
employees under any law with respect to injuries, diseases, or death of employees
arising out of, or in the course of, employment.
126. Summit, 21 BNA OSHC 1196, 2010 WL 3341872, at *16.
127. Id. at 18.
128. Sasser Elec. & Mfg. Co., 11 BNA OSHC 2133 (No. 82 178, 1984), 1984 WL 34886, at *3
(involving a subcontractor crane operator crashing crane into electrical wires on premises owner's
property).
129. Id.
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Darden and its relevance to the Multiemployer Citation Policy
("MCP")'so should be explored further."'
ii. THE DEBATE REGARDING THE MCP's PROCEDURAL LEGALITY
UNDER ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Besides addressing Darden's applicability, the Eighth Circuit also
was confronted with the questioned legitimacy of the MCP. In the com-
mission proceeding appealed to the Eighth Circuit, the commission
stated that the MCP was inconsistent with construction safety regula-
tionsl 32 and that the major support for using the MED to extend liability
to a general contractor13 3 was based on commission dictum that took on
a life of its own.134 Therefore, OSHA's only relevant argument for
extending the MED was its MCP, which the commission found unper-
suasive.13 5 The commission reiterated that policy statements are not
given the same deference as promulgated standards.136
130. Occ. SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., supra note 30.
131. Additionally, some may argue that Summit might be of limited application. One, the
decision only applies to the construction industry. See Steven G. Biddle, "Controlling Employer"
No Longer Liable Under Multi-Employer Worksite Doctrine, ASAP: A Littler Mendelson Time
Sensitive Newsletter, June 2007, at 1-2, available at http://www.littler.com/files/press/pdf/l6730.
pdf; Jackson Lewis, Federal OSHA Review Commission Overturns Enforcement Policy for Multi-
Employer Construction Job Sites, May 9, 2007, available at http://www.jacksonlewis.com/
legalupdates/article.cfm?aid= l 13 (last visited Nov. 27, 2011). Two, general contractors may still
be cited for safety and health hazards if they expose their own employees to a hazard or create a
hazard. Id. Three, Summit should be limited to its facts because Summit Contractors assumed
significant control over the operations, inspected the worksite daily, actively corrected previous
violations, and reserved the right to remove subcontractors' employees from the jobsite. See
Summit Contractors, Inc., 22 BNA OSHC 1777 (No. 03-1622, 2009), 2009 WL 2857148, at *2. In
essence, Summit Contractors retained the requisite control under the Teal test. See supra notes
63-64 and accompanying text. These responsibilities exercised by Summit Contractors are
distinct from those of a premises owner, such as Florida Juice, and should be treated differently.
See also Sasser Elec. & Manufg, Co., II BNA OSHC 2133, 1984 WL 34886, at *3 ("[Wlhen
some of the work is performed by a specialist, an employer is justified in relying upon the
specialist to protect against hazards related to the specialist's expertise so long as . .. reliance is
reasonable and the [owner] has no reason to foresee that the work will be performed unsafely.").
However, the current MED leaves open the possibility that these distinct situations can be
potentially treated the same, causing greater confusion for parties and courts.
132. Summit Contractors, Inc. (Summit II), 21 BNA OSHC 2020 (No. 03-1622, 2007), 2007
OSAHRC LEXIS 34, at *13-*19.
133. See Grossman Steel & Aluminum Corp., 4 BNA OSHC 1185 (No. 12775, 1976), 1976
OSAHRC LEXIS 528, at *11, *11 n.6.
134. Summit 1, 21 BNA OSHC 2020, 2007 OSAHRC LEXIS 34, at *6-*7.
135. Id. at *8-*9, *15-*16.
136. Id. at *15 (citing "cf Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (policy
statements while 'entitled to respect' are not given Chevron deference like promulgated
standards")). The commission also reiterated that OSHRCs are not a policy-setting agency. Id.;
see also Marx, supra note 30, at 177 n.17 ("There is no reference to multi-employer worksites in
the Act or its legislative history.").
Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 553, OSHA may promulgate standards, or informal rules, through a
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On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the
OSHRC's ruling, holding that the MCP was consistent with construction
safety regulations.' The Eighth Circuit relied heavily on an interpreta-
tion of the construction-specific regulations and on its binding circuit
precedent to find a duty owed by Summit. The court also highlighted
that Summit maintained four supervisors on site at all times. Impor-
tantly, these supervisors also inserted themselves in the supervising of
the safety techniques of the subcontractor's employees.' In its reason-
ing, the court explained the confusion surrounding the multiemployer
worksite dilemma, noting how the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
has questioned whether the MCP's controlling employer citation policy
violates OSHA's regulatory framework.'"
Additionally, the court noted an amicus argument that the Secretary
of Labor lacked the legal capacity to enforce the MCP because the pol-
icy was not adopted pursuant to the informal rulemaking procedures. 4 0
process known as "Notice and Comment Rulemaking." See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006). These
legislative rules have the same force as statutes. See I KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J.
PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.1 (3d ed. 1994). The major procedural
requirements are:
Notice of the 'legal authority under which rule is proposed'; notice of the 'terms or
substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved';
a comment period during which 'interested persons [shall have] an opportunity to
participate in the rulemaking through submission of written data, views, or
arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation'; and production, after
'consideration of the relevant matter presented [of a] concise general statement of
[the rules'] basis and purpose.
RoNALD A. CASS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASE AND MATERIALS 337 (5th ed. 2006). Notice
and Comment Rulemaking, however, is not required for general statements of policy. 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(b)(3)(A). That said, general statements of policy lack the binding force of law; otherwise,
the policy statements are rules and must be promulgated as rules consistent with the procedures of
5 U.S.C § 553. See DAVIS & PIERCE, supra, at § 6.2.
According to Professors Davis and Pierce, Notice and Comment Rulemaking and general
statements of policy differ in three major respects: their procedures, their binding effect, and their
reviewability. Id. First, an agency, with certain exceptions, cannot promulgate a rule without
following notice and comment procedures while an agency's creation of a policy statement is
exempted from notice and comment procedures. Id. Second, while a rule can bind the public, a
general statement of policy cannot. Id. Third, reviewability varies between rules and general
statements of policy depending on ripeness, exhaustion, and finality. Id.
137. Solis v. Summit Contractors, Inc., 558 F.3d 815, 825 (8th Cir. 2009).
138. Id. at 824. Similar to the Teal test, control is a major factor in this opinion.
139. Id. at 821; see also supra Part II.A (explaining why the MCP is important to this Article's
analysis of a business premises owner's liability in tort actions).
140. Id. at 826-27 n.6 (noting that the Supreme Court has explained that "Congress did not
intend for [the] OSHRC to use its 'adjudicatory power to play a policymaking
role' . . . . Therefore, the Secretary may be required to submit its multi-employer worksite policy
to the informal rulemaking process, unless the multi-employer citation policy is an interpretive
rule or a statement of policy."); see also 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2006) ("'[R]ule' means the whole or
part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to
implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or
OWNER BEWARE
However, the court did not reach the argument because it was raised by
an amicus brief.14 '
On remand, an OSHRC panel, relying in part on an earlier OSHRC
panel's decision, held that the MCP did not require informal rulemaking
because the MCP allegedly does not create in fact or law a liability on
the employer.1 42
This Article argues that the OSHRC is misguided in its conclusion
and its reliance on a 1977 commission precedent and that OSHA's fail-
ure to engage in notice and comment rulemaking is the genesis for the
current state of confusion surrounding business premises owner tort lia-
bility with respect to an independent contractor's employees. The MCP
does create a duty that would not exist otherwise. As explained previ-
ously, an OSHRC panel vacated an OSHA's multiemployer citation as
beyond its authority the first time OSHA cited an employer for exposing
another employer's employees to a hazardous condition.'4 3 Following
the proper course set forth in the APA, OSHA began the rulemaking
process by issuing a notice of public comment for a new regulation
establishing the MED citation scheme.' 44 The notice, emphasizing the
construction industry, was an early version of the MCP.115 The notice,
however, was retracted after a subsequent OSHRC accepted the MED in
1976.146 In fact, the case 4 7 relied on by the commission to support the
MED citation scheme's extension to a general contractor cites to Gross-
man Steel & Aluminum Corporation, which did not even involve a gen-
practice requirements of an agency and includes the approval or prescription for the future of
rates, wages, corporate or financial structures or reorganization thereof, prices, facilities,
appliances, services or allowances therefor or of valuations, costs, or accounting, or practices
bearing on any of the foregoing.").
141. Because the Eleventh Circuit has yet to address the validity of the MED, it is in an ideal
position to resolve the conflict and spur OSHA to engage in overdue notice and comment
rulemaking with regards to the MCP and MED, preventing future confusion in commission
proceedings and tort cases.
142. Summit Contractors, Inc., 22 BNA OSHC 1777 (No. 03-1622, 2009), 2009 WL 2857148,
at *3 (citing Limbach Co., 6 BNA OSHC 1244, 1246 (No. 14302, 1977), 1977 WL 7916).
143. See Brennan v. Giles & Cotting, Inc., 504 F.2d 1255, 1262 (4th Cir. 1974).
144. Citation Guidelines in Multi-employer Worksites, supra note 30 (proposing regulation to
enforce OSHA violations in multiemployer situations, including when owners have safety
responsibilities for worksite); see also 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2006) ("General notice of proposed rule
making shall be published in the Federal Register, unless persons subject thereto are named and
either personally served or otherwise have actual notice thereof in accordance with the law.").
145. See Citation Guidelines in Multi-employer Worksites, supra note 30 (proposing
regulation to enforce OSHA violations in multiemployer situations, including when owners have
safety responsibilities for worksite); see also 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2006).
146. See Sapper, supra note 41, at 16; Brief for Sec'y of Labor at 11-12, Solis v. Summit
Contractors, Inc., 558 F.3d 815 (8th Cir. 2009) (No. 07-2191); see also Limbach Co., 6 BNA
OSHC 1244, 1977 WL 7916, at *3 (noting that OSHA retracted proposed rules after subsequent
decision found a citation that was a precursor to the current MCP a valid action).
147. Limbach Co., 6 BNA OSHC 1244, 1977 WL 7916, at *2-*3.
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eral contractor. Further, the Grossman Steel & Aluminum Corporation
commission acknowledged that it was performing quasi-rulemaking in
an adjudication-or, at best, an advisory opinion-explaining:
The instant case does not involve an employer who created a hazard
to which employees other than his own were exposed, nor does it
involve a general contractor. Our discussion of the responsibilities of
such employers is therefore dictum. We cannot, however, consider
the liability of one particular class of construction employer in a vac-
uum. The responsibilities of all contractors on a construction site are
intertwined, and.must be determined in a coherent fashion. Therefore,
although some of the rules set forth herein do not apply to this partic-
ular case, we fully expect to follow them in appropriate cases.14 8
Thus, the basis for the current substantive change in an employer's
duty is based on an advisory opinion or, at the very least, a commission
acting beyond its substantive limitations. What makes this analysis even
more perplexing is that the OSHRC is not a policy-setting agency, yet
OSHA has cited to this commission's opinion for support.'4 9 OSHA,
itself, promulgates regulations and enforces the regulations while the
OSHRC adjudicates challenges to OSHA citations. In fact, during the
legislative process, some senators raised concerns about giving OSHA
all three typical administrative tools-prosecuting, rulemaking, and
adjudicating.' Therefore, stating that an OSHRC panel expanded
OSHA's citation enforcement power by an adjudication presents a quan-
dary."' However, it was this adjudication which fortified the Secretary
of Labor's current MCP and the then-nascent version of the MED which
led to the MCP's present form that does affect substantive rights. More-
over, the lack of rulemaking creates greater confusion at the worksite.
With how fungible the MED and its MCP are, a business premises
148. Grossman Steel & Aluminum Corp., 4 BNA OSHC 1185 (No. 12775, 1976), 1976
OSAHRC LEXIS 528, at * Il n.6 (emphasis added). Furthermore, as the dissenting commissioner
notes, the majority relies on a National Labor Relations Board opinion in order to distinguish a
circuit court opinion that was factually indistinguishable. Id. at *19 n.11 (Commissioner Moran,
dissenting). But see Reply Brief for Sec'y of Labor at 6-7, Solis v. Summit Contractors, Inc., 558
F.3d 815 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing the rationale in Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 513 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1975), for MED).
149. See Reply Brief for Sec'y of Labor at 33-35, Solis v. Summit Contractors, Inc., 558 F.3d
815 (8th Cir. 2009).
150. See Donovan v. A. Amorello & Sons, Inc., 761 F.2d 61, 65 (1st Cir. 1985) (discussing
legislative history of OSHA).
151. Id. (noting that Congress specifically did not place rulemaking powers in a body
independent of OSHA); see also Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499
U.S. 144, 153-54 (1991) (noting that Congress did not "expect the Commission to possess
authoritative interpretative powers" and that the Court could not "infer that Congress expected the
Commission to use its adjudicatory power to play a policymaking role") (emphasis in original).
But see Limbach Co., 6 BNA OSHC 1244, 1977 WL 7916, at *3 (rejecting the claim that the
Grossman Steel commission acted in a prosecutorial manner).
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owner, absent the owner asserting control over the worksite, may argua-
bly not be on notice of the extent of its liability to an independent con-
tractor's employees under OSHA and its exposure to a possible
subsequent tort action. 152 Additionally, one may question whether the
MCP is truly a policy statement and not a substantive rule cloaked in a
policy statement's dress.
The 1977 OSHA review commission's decision, which the Summit
II commission on remand relied upon, explained that MED is merely a
policy statement, and thus, was exempted from the notice and comment
requirements of rulemaking.' The APA does not define policy state-
ments; however, a 1947 Attorney General Manual defined general state-
ments of policy to mean agency "statements issued by an agency to
advise the public prospectively of the manner in which the agency pro-
poses to exercise a discretionary power."14 The manual also explained
that the statement is not binding and is more a statement of intent.
To determine if a policy statement affects substantive rights and
thus must be categorized as a rule subject to APA rulemaking proce-
dures, courts often apply the legal effect test.155 When evaluating the
152. See supra note 29.
153. Limbach Co., 6 BNA OSHC 1244, 1977 WL 7916, at *2-*3; see also 5 U.S.C § 553
("Except when notice or hearing is required by statute, [the subsection regarding notice and
comment rulemaking] does not apply (A) to interpretive rules, general statements of policy, or
rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice . . . .").
154. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENS MANUAL ON THE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT 30
n.3 (1947), available at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/APA/REFERENCES/REFERENCE
WORKS/AGO3.HTM#RF3 (last visited Aug. 9, 2010). The Attorney General's Manual is given
substantial weight because the Attorney General was actively involved in the promulgation of the
APA. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33, 38 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
In his lengthy dissent to the ruling in Summit, Commissioner Thompson explained that the
Tenth Circuit's Universal Construction opinion, which upheld an OSHA citation against a
construction site's general contractor for a subcontractor's violation based on the specific duty
clause and legislative intent of the Act, gave Chevron-style deference to the MCP. Summit
Contractors, Inc., 23 BNA OSHC 1196 (No. 05-0839, 2010), 2010 WL 3341872, at *17 n.18
(Commissioner Thompson, dissenting); Universal Constr. Co. v. Occupational Health & Safety
Review Comm'n, 182 F.3d 726 (10th Cir. 1999). However, as Commissioner Thompson
elaborated, the Universal holding was prior to the Supreme Court holding in Christensen that
"'interpretations . . . in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of
which lack the force of law-do not warrant Chevron-style deference."' Summit, 23 BNA OSHC
1196, 2010 WL 3341872, at *17 n.18 (Commissioner Thompson, dissenting) (quoting Christensen
v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)). Commissioner Thompson also notes that the
Secretary of Labor has "never supplied any analysis whatsoever of the legal authority supporting
the [MCP], let alone the multiple changes of course in her guidelines." Id. at *34 (Commissioner
Thompson, dissenting). However, the majority of the commission reasoned that the Secretary of
Labor did not need to engage in notice and comment rulemaking because the MCP "imposes no
new duties on employers, and is, therefore not a standard or substantive rule." Id. at *2 n.5
(majority opinion). However, the majority may be mistaken because under the MCP, a premises
owner such as Florida Juice presumptively now owes a duty to an independent contractor's
employee that it did not previously owe under the Act, OSHA regulations, or common law.
155. CASS ET AL., supra note 136, at 448.
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legal effect, courts evaluate: "[1] the language of the statement, [2] the
circumstances of its promulgation, and [3] [the] way in which the
agency itself characterizes it."1 5 6 Describing this legal distinction
between a policy statement exception and an agency policy requiring
rulemaking, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit emphasized that a
policy statement does not establish a "binding norm" and is not "deter-
minative of [ ] issues or rights."15' However, OSHA's MCP directly
conflicts with this definition of a policy statement. Although the MCP
began as mere guidance, it has become a de facto law of OSHA, affect-
ing the substantive rights of employers at multiemployer worksites well
beyond the construction industry and causing inefficient allocation of
resources and costly litigation as evidenced by the Florida Juice hypo-
thetical. The language of the MCP provides how to evaluate reasonable
care, defines exposing, creating, controlling, and correcting employers,
and goes beyond mere explanation of policy.' Therefore, it should be
subject to notice and comment rulemaking. More succinctly, "[t]o
impose the Secretary's rule on these employers [may be] absurd as a
matter of rational policy."1 59
C. A Court's Narrower Reading of OSHA in Tort Actions
Prior to Summit 1, 160 one court had already rejected the MED in tort
actions.16 In Melerine v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc.,16 2 the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that no employment relation-
ship existed between the injured and the general contractor; therefore, no
duty was owed because "[w]hile [OSHA regulations] are evidence of a
156. Id. at 449.
157. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 506 F.2d at 38, 39 ("When the agency states that in subsequent
proceedings it will thoroughly consider not only the policy's applicability to the facts of a given
case but also the underlying validity of the policy itself, then the agency intends to treat the order
as a general statement of policy" (citations omitted)).
158. See Occ. SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., supra note 30.
159. Solis v. Summit Contractors, Inc., 558 F.3d 815, 833 (8th Cir. 2009) (Beam, J.,
dissenting). An Arkansas Supreme Court opinion analogized an employer's duty to those
obligations between a husband and wife:
A law that defines the rights and duties of husbands and wives has reference to the
obligations of each husband to his own wife, not to the wife of another. Similarly,
the duty of an employer to employees clearly means to his own employees and not
those of some other employer, unless the language permits no other conclusion.
Horn v. Shirley, 441 S.W.2d 468, 471 (Ark. 1969).
160. Summit Contractors, Inc. (Summit 1), 23 BNA OSHC 1769 (No. 05-0839, 2006), 2006
OSAHRC LEXIS 33, at *15, *15 n.2 (explaining that the legal foundation for multiemployer
liability has been swept away by Darden).
161. See Melerine v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 659 F.2d 706, 707, 710-11, 711, 712 (5th Cir.
Unit A Oct. 1981)
162. Id. (involving tort action by independent contractor's employee against general contractor
for injuries sustained during ship conversion).
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general standard of care due employees, they establish no standard of
care due third persons." 6 3 With no duty being owed, OSHA could not
create one because OSHA "neither enlarges nor diminishes 'common
law or statutory rights, duties, or liabilities.' "164
Eleventh Circuit defendants have relied on Melerinel65 because the
decision was rendered around the time of the Fifth Circuit split,16 6 and
the decision relied upon Fifth Circuit precedent, which is part of the
Eleventh Circuit's corpus juris." Specifically, Melerine cited South-
eastern Contractors, Inc. v. Dunlop,168 in which the court adopted
Chairman Moran of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Com-
mission's argument that "there can be no violation of the Act by a
163. Id. at 707 (emphasis added). To support its conclusion, Melerine cited Fifth Circuit
precedent that "OSHA regulations protect only an employer's own employees." Id. at 710-11; see
also United States v. Pitt-Des Moines, Inc., 168 F.3d 976, 985 (7th Cir. 1999) (limiting the
applicability.of the specific duty clause under OSHA); deJesus v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co.,
281 So. 2d 198, 201 (Fla. 1973) (stating plaintiff must establish that he is of the class the statute
intended to protect).
164. Melerine, 659 F.2d at 709, 710-11 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (2006)). Specifically,
§ 653(b)(4) states:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to supersede or in any manner affect any
workmen's compensation law or to enlarge or diminish or affect in any other
manner the common law or statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of employers and
employees under any law with respect to injuries, diseases, or death of employees
arising out of, or in the course of, employment.
Id.; see also Int'l Ship Repair & Marine Servs. v. Estate of Morales-Montalvo, No. 8:08-cv-1617-
T-23AEP, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2219, at *13-*14 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 12, 2010) (finding that
independent contractor's employee was not a ship owner's employee in tort and thus not within
the class sought to be protected under OSHA regulations and holding, while citing Melerine, that
ship owner's violation of an OSHA regulation "fails to establish negligence as a matter of law").
But see Miller, supra note 52, at 637 n. 144 (arguing Congress only may have intended § 653(b)(4)
to avoid upsetting rights between employers and employees in situations usually covered by
workmen's compensation, and thus, not affecting a third party being deemed employer in tort).
165. See, e.g., Turner v. Scott Paper Co., No. 94-0284-P-M, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6769, at
*I (S.D. Ala. May 18, 1995) (relying on Melerine and Fifth Circuit precedent in refusing to permit
in tort action the use of OSHA to impose a duty on an owner for independent contractor's
employee).
166. Melerine, 659 F.2d at 709 (relying on Fifth Circuit Unit A decision). But see Access
Equipment Systems Inc., 18 BNA OSHC 1718 (No. 95-1449, 1999), 1999 OSAHRC LEXIS 38,
at *31, *31 n.12 (stating Eleventh Circuit has yet to address MED, citing rule that only Fifth
Circuit Unit B, not Unit A, decisions are binding on Eleventh Circuit). However, Access relies on
Stein v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 667 F.2d 33, 34 (1lth Cir. 1982), which has been distinguished to
state that the Eleventh Circuit meant to adopt all Fifth Circuit cases as of September 30, 1981 as
binding precedent. See Patrick v. City of Florala, 793 F. Supp. 301, 305 n. I1 (M.D. Ala. 1992).
167. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (adopting
Fifth Circuit's body of law as it existed on September 30, 1981 as binding precedent).
168. 512 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1975). But see Access Equipment Systems Inc., 18 BNA OSHC
1718, 1999 OSAHRC LEXIS 38, at *31, *31 n.12 (arguing original OSHA citation against
Southeastern Contractors was prior to adoption of MED). However, OSHA's treatment of
multiemployer worksites was already at issue as early as 1972. See generally Zebrowski, supra
note 24 (explaining OSHA's treatment of liability at multiemployer worksites).
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respondent for failure to comply with a standard which charges some
other employer with the duty of implementing the standard." 6 9 Melerine
also cited Barrera v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co.'"o and Jeter v. St.
Regis Paper Co.,' in which the court held that OSHA does not create
duties between employers and independent contractors' employees.' 72
To date, no Eleventh Circuit court has specifically addressed the
MED."' Nonetheless, the Eleventh Circuit and state courts such as Flor-
ida's may rely on Melerine as persuasive precedent.17 4 Moreover, not-
withstanding Melerine, based on state law like Florida's1'7  and the
reasoning behind the MED,176 states should not permit OSHA, under its
current MED, to be used to establish a duty of care or evidence of negli-
gence in tort actions against premises owners such as Florida Juice.' 7
D. A State's Approach to Tort Actions by Independent Contractors
in Inherently Dangerous Occupations
In many jurisdictions, whether an owner exercised control is the
determinative factor driving the application of the Multiemployer Doc-
trine ("MED") in a tort action. 1 The same holds true in Florida tort
169. Melerine, 659 F.2d at 711 (emphasis added and citations omitted).
170. 653 F.2d 915, 920 (5th Cir. Unit A Aug. 1981) (stating in a tort action against an owner
by independent contractor's employee that it is long settled in the circuit that "OSHA does not
create duties between employers and invitees, only between employers and their employees.").
171. 507 F.2d 973, 977 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that owner owed no duty under OSHA to
independent contractor's employee when painter fell while painting owner's silo).
172. Melerine, 659 F.2d. at 709.
173. See Access Equipment Systems Inc., 18 BNA OSHC 1718, 1999 OSAHRC LEXIS 38, at
31 n.12. But see Calloway v. PPG Indus., Inc., 155 F. App'x 450, 455 (11th Cir. 2005) (per
curiam) (stating that in the Eleventh Circuit, the MED has not been extended to premises owner
when owner is not general contractor (citations omitted)); Turner v. Scott Paper Co., No. 94-0284-
P-M, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6769, at *1 (S.D. Ala. May 18, 1995) (relying on Melerine and Fifth
Circuit precedent in refusing to permit OSHA to be used in a tort action to impose a duty on an
owner with respect to an independent contractor's employee (citations omitted)).
174. Int'l Ship Repair & Marine Servs., Inc., v. Estate of Morales-Montalvo, No. 8:08-cv-
1617-T-23AEP, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2219, at *13-*14 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 12, 2010) (citing
Melerine when holding that ship owner's violation of an OSHA regulation "fails to establish
negligence as a matter of law" in action brought by independent contractor's employee); Turner v.
Scott Paper Co., No. 94-0284-P-M, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6769, at *1 (S.D. Ala. May 18, 1995)
(relying on Melerine and Fifth Circuit precedent in refusing to permit in tort action the use of
OSHA to impose duty on owner with respect to an independent contractor's employee).
175. See infra Parts 1I1.D and IV.A.
176. See supra Part II.A.
177. See supra Part I.
178. See Teal v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 728 F.2d 799, 804 (6th Cir. 1984)
(emphasizing control as part of Teal test); see also supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text
(explaining Teal in light of Ellis).
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actions." 9 Therefore, OSHA, by definition, so cannot create a duty
absent a duty owed under Florida common law, which requires proof
that the owner exercised control or committed an affirmative act of neg-
ligence under Florida law.'" Additionally, an OSHA violation arguably
may not be used as evidence of negligence in tort actions.182 This con-
flicting state law issue is another unresolved externality of OSHA's cur-
rent MED and multiemployer citation scheme.
I. FLORIDA PREMISEs LIABILITY AND FLORIDA POWER &
LIGHT CO. V. PRICE
Under Florida law, a premises owner owes a business invitee"' a
duty to keep his property reasonably safe and to protect the invitee from
dangers of which he is or should be aware.' 84 However, in Florida, there
is an independent contractor'18  exception to the business invitee rule."'
The "primary factor" in determining independent contractor status is
"the degree of control exercised [by the contractee] over the details of
the work."' This emphasis on control parallels other jurisdictions
requiring control before applying OSHA to a premises owner.' 88 There-
fore, similar to other jurisdictions, Florida courts have held that a con-
tractee is not ordinarily liable for injuries sustained by an independent
contractor. Notwithstanding this exception, Chapter 769 of the Florida
179. See Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Price, 170 So. 2d 293, 298 (Fla. 1964) (per curiam)
(emphasizing independent contractor's employees are not under owner's control).
180. See 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (2006).
181. See Maddox v. Ford Motor Co., No. 94-4153, 1996 WL 272385, at *3-*4 (6th Cir. May
21, 1996) (stating once no duty established under state common law, OSHA cannot then create a
duty); supra notes 61-77 and accompanying text (discussing Teal test); see also Teal, 728 F.2d at
804 (emphasizing control as part of Teal test for extending OSHA duty to premises owner).
182. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text (explaining that if no duty owed under
state law then OSHA cannot be used as evidence of negligence).
183. In Post v. Lunney, the Florida Supreme Court adopted § 332 of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts' definition of business invitee: "a person who is invited to enter or remain on the land for
a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the possessor of the land."
261 So. 2d 146, 148 (Fla. 1972).
184. Id. at 147.
185. The Florida Supreme Court in Cantor v. Cochran established Florida's adoption of § 220
the Restatement (Second) of Agency to determine an independent contractor relationship. 184 So.
2d 173, 174-75 (Fla. 1966).
186. See Fla. Publ'g Co. v. Lourcey, 193 So. 847 (Fla. 1940). But see Strickland v. Timco
Aviation Servs., Inc., 66 So. 3d 1002, 1007 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (noting that courts will
apply the business visitors analysis to the claim of an injured independent contractor's employee
against a premises owner if the employee is injured not in the course of the work he is hired to
perform but rather while he is attempting to access the premises to perform that work).
187. Paul N. Howard Co. v. Affholder, Inc., 701 So. 2d 402, 404 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997);
see also 4139 Mgmt., Inc. v. Dep't of Labor & Emp't, 763 So. 2d 514, 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2000) ("The first element of the Cantor test, control, is a primary indicator of status.").
188. See Teal v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 728 F.2d 799, 804 (6th Cir. 1984).
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Statutes provides that entities involved in hazardous occupations'" are
liable for injuries to and deaths of their agents and employeesl 90 and
cannot contract away liability.' 9 ' Specifically, Chapter 769 addresses
those issues that arise from an employer's common law defenses to
employee's injuries arising out of employment.' 92 In Florida Power &
Light Co. v. Price, the seminal case for hazardous occupation tort
actions by independent contractors' employees against premises owners,
the Florida Supreme Court attempted to clarify a premises owner's lia-
bility when the owner hires an independent contractor and the indepen-
dent contractor's employee is injured, absent the owner's affirmative act
of negligence.193
In Price, an independent contractor's employee was working on the
construction of the owner's electrical distribution system when a fellow
employee of the independent contractor caused the plaintiff to be elec-
trocuted. 194 The plaintiff alleged under the inherently dangerous work
doctrine and Chapter 769 that Florida Power owed him a duty of not
permitting the distribution system to be energized without proper super-
vision and control by the owner itself. In the alternative, the Plaintiff
alleged that Florida Power was vicariously liable for the independent
contractor's negligence.195
Price rejected the plaintiff's contention and emphasized the excep-
tion to the inherently dangerous work doctrine, stating that the inher-
ently dangerous work doctrine does not ipso facto render the owner
liable and that § 769.01 does not have the effect of automatically waiv-
ing recognized exceptions to the doctrine.196 Emphasizing the impor-
tance of preserving the exceptions to the inherently dangerous work
doctrine and dangerous instrumentality doctrine, the court clarified that
the exceptions "grow[] out of the relationship created by the indepen-
dent contract and the assumption of risks that are necessarily concomi-
189. FLA. STAT. § 769.01 (2012) ("This chapter shall apply to persons engaged in the
following hazardous occupations in this state; namely, railroading, operating street railways,
generating and selling electricity, telegraph and telephone business, express business, blasting and
dynamiting, operating automobiles for public use, boating, when boat is propelled by steam, gas
or electricity.") Florida Juice would be an entity under this chapter. See supra Part I.
190. FLA. STAT. § 769.02 (2012).
191. FLA. STAT. § 769.06 (2012).
192. FLA. STAT. § 769.04 (2012) (eliminating the doctrine of "assumption of risk" in cases
arising under Chapter 769).
193. 170 So. 2d 293, 297 (Fla. 1964) (per curiam) (reiterating that "the duties which a
contractee owes to employees of the independent contractor are less than those owing to third
persons" (emphasis added)).
194. Id. at 294-95 (stating worker shocked by energized wire on power pole).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 297.
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tant."' 97 The court's refusal to permit the statute to impose strict liability
on the owner parallels other courts that have held that the existence of
OSHA regulations does not equate to strict liability unless the individual
is within the class to be protected and there is a violation of the Act.'9 8
The court further reasoned that being an entity under § 769.01
alone "does not render [owner] liable for injuries to an employee of its
independent contractor caused by the negligence of a fellow employee
of the independent contractor unless it can be shown [that the owner] in
some way contributed or concurred in the act of negligence."l 9 9 Further,
the court reasoned that if any duty was owed, it was limited, surmising
that a contractee/owner only owed an independent contractor's
employee a duty to warn of "'latent or potential dangers on the prem-
ises'" or use ordinary care to furnish protection against such dangers to
employees "'who are without actual or constructive notice of the
dangers.' "200
Price reasoned that an owner has a limited duty because "[t]he
independent contractor is usually placed in charge of the work site and is
responsible for all incidental contingencies and is aware or presumed to
be aware of the usual hazards incident to the performance of his con-
tract."201' This reasoning is consistent with the Seventh Circuit's decision
in Merritt, which rejected extending OSHA to impose a duty on an
owner or to permit admission of OSHA violation as evidence of
negligence. 2 0 2
197. Id. at 298-99 (distinguishing the situation from one involving members of the general
public).
198. Cf supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text (discussing requirement of common law
duty before admitting OSHA); see also Trowell v. Brunswick Pulp and Paper Co., 522 F. Supp.
782, 784 (D.S.C. 1981) (stating OSHA does not create a duty of compliance with OSHA standards
for non-employee's benefit).
199. Price, 170 So. 2d at 297. Based on this phrase, some courts have argued that Price is
limited to cases involving negligence by a fellow employee of an independent contractor. See
Maule Indus., Inc. v. Watson, 201 So. 2d 631, 633 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (distinguishing Price
based on negligence of owner as basis of action; however, the court in Maule Industries
questioned whether the owner was the actual employer). However, the more prevalent
interpretation expands Price, exempting the owner from liability even absent negligence by a
fellow employee of an independent contractor so long as the owner was not negligent by action or
omission. See Skow v. Dep't of Transp., 468 So. 2d 422, 424 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
200. Price, 170 So. 2d at 296 (quoting Florida Power & Light Co. v. Robinson, 68 So. 2d 406,
411 (Fla. 1953) (citations omitted)). However, if the employee has actual or constructive notice of
the danger, the contractee owes no duty to warn the independent contractor's employee. But see
Atl. Coast Dev. Corp. v. Napoleon Steel Contractors, Inc., 385 So. 2d 676, 679 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1980) (stating that owner who is duly a general contractor owes a duty, but "[a]bsent active
participation or the dual capacity of owner/general contractor[,] . . . an owner will not normally be
held responsible for providing a safe work area when he has turned control and oversight of the
project over to a general contractor." (emphasis added)).
201. Price, 170 So. 2d at 298.
202. Merritt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 875 F.2d 603, 605 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Where an invitee is
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Emphasizing further an independent contractor's responsibility, the
Florida Supreme Court explained that Chapter 769 does not make the
independent contractor's employees the owner's employees and that
these employees are not under the owner's direction or control.20 3
Because of this limited duty, an owner's liability to an independent con-
tractor's employee does not arise "[u]nless and until it is shown the con-
tracting owner by positive act of negligence or negligent omission on his
part causes injury to the independent contractor or to the latter's
employee or employees." 2 04 However, as in Teal, if the owner engages
in an affirmative act of negligence by controlling the work, the owner is
directly liable for breach of a common law duty of care and the excep-
tions to the inherently dangerous work doctrine and dangerous instru-
mentality doctrine no longer apply. Thus, the exceptions to the rule are
not without bounds.20 5
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN OWNER'S LIABILITY IN A
STATE'S COMMON LAW
Price set forth the exception to inherently dangerous work doctrine
and dangerous instrumentality doctrine-absent an affirmative act or
omission of negligence, an owner owes no duty to an independent con-
tractor's injured employee working in a hazardous occupation. Moreo-
ver, this exception is consistent with the application of the MED in tort
actions in which an owner was held liable for OSHA violations only
possessing of knowledge equal or superior to that of the landowner of the hazard causing the
injury, the landowner is relieved of any duty which might have otherwise been imposed." (citation
omitted)).
203. Price, 170 So. 2d at 298 ("[Tihe exception to the doctrines grows out of the relationship
created by the independent contract and the assumption of risks that are necessarily
concomitant."). Though not mentioned expressly, it is understood that if the owner controlled the
project or committed an affirmative act of negligence, the Price exception would not be applicable
because the employer-independent contractor relationship would be vitiated. See supra text
accompanying notes 187-88 (discussing the importance of control in the independent contractor
relationship); see also supra text accompanying notes 66-70 (emphasizing control as part of the
Teal test for extending an OSHA duty to premises owner). Thus, ultimately control is the critical
factor in one's analysis.
204. Price, 170 So. 2d at 298; see also St. Lucie Harvesting & Caretaking Corp. v. Cervantes,
639 So. 2d 37, 38-39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (stating rule that for owner to be liable for injuries
sustained by independent contractors' employees, owner must actively participate 'to the extent
that he directly influences the manner in which the work is performed' and negligently creates or
allows a dangerous condition to exist") (citations omitted)).
205. The Florida Supreme Court explained the difficulty of establishing a firm rule for all
occasions:
[Ilt is difficult to state the exception or exceptions to said rules with overall
particularity, the reason being that each case presents its own peculiar factual
situation and the best that may be done is to eschew a blanket rule which allows no
exceptions and permit the latitude of recognizing exceptions . . ..
Price, 170 So. 2d at 298.
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when it committed an affirmative act of negligence with regards to the
employee.20 6
Since the Florida Supreme Court's ruling, subsequent courts have
explained and expanded this basic exception.2 0 7 In Lake Parker Mall,
Inc. v. Carson, the court held that an owner satisfied a duty to warn of
latent dangers by notifying a worker's supervisor.2 08 Moreover, Skow v.
Department of Transportation, similar to Calloway v. PPG Industries'
treatment of OSHA 2 09 held that requiring an independent contractor to
comply with federal safety regulations while still reserving the right to
inspect does not impose a duty on the premises owner.2 10 In Skow, the
court reiterated the importance of control, which is the focal point of the
Teal test.2 1' Additionally, it limited an owner's duty, stating that
although the contract required the independent contractor to comply
with safety regulations, it "did not impose an explicit duty on [the
owner] to monitor, inspect, and correct violations by [the independent
contractor]" and that absent negligence, "no duty, delegable or nondele-
206. See Barrera v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 653 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. Unit A Aug. 1981);
Davenport v. Summit Contractors, Inc., 612 S.E.2d 239, 243 n.8 (Va. Ct. App. 2005) (stating that
courts upholding the MED against general contractors "overlook the fact that, in their cases, the
party held liable actually created the worksite hazard, e.g., Teal, 728 F.2d at 801, Brennan, 513
F.2d at 1039." (emphasis in original)).
207. See, e.g., Johnson v. Boca Raton Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 985 So. 2d 593, 596, 597 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2008) ("[T]he owner's duty to warn depends upon whether the dangerous condition was
known to the owner but unknown to the independent contractor" . . . [and] "an abnormally
dangerous condition does not include the work product of the contractor after he or she takes
control of the premises or conditions which arise after and as a result of the independent
contract."); Skow v. Dep't of Transp., 468 So. 2d 422, 424 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (following
Price).
208. Lake Parker Mall, Inc. v. Carson, 327 So. 2d 121, 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (citations
omitted) (holding premises owner satisfied duty to warn in wrongful death action involving
independent contractor's employee). But see Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Robinson, 68 So. 2d 406,
412-13 (Fla. 1953) (holding for independent contractor's employee when owner failed to
adequately inform independent contractor of latent, subterranean rotten condition of poles to be
removed). Robinson further shows the importance that an owner not commit an affirmative act of
negligence by failing to warn when it has superior knowledge.
209. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
210. Skow, 468 So. 2d at 423-24 (holding owner of bridge owed no duty when independent
contractor's employee, not wearing safety belt, slipped and grabbed a pile driver, which crushed
his hand).
211. Id. at 424 ("[A]lthough DOT actively participated in the inspection of work done by [the
independent contractor], this was done only to ascertain the results of the work and not to control
the method of performance or to insure [the independent contractor's] compliance with safety
regulations."); see Teal v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 728 F.2d 799, 804 (6th Cir. 1984).
Indian River Foods, Inc. v. Braswell, 660 So. 2d 1093, 1098 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995), reiterated
this limitation by quoting City of Miami v. Perez, 509 So. 2d 343, 346 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987),
which stated that the owner may maintain the independent contractor relationship while retaining
"the right to inspect, to stop the work, to make suggestions or recommendations as to the details of
the work, or to prescribe alterations or deviations in the work."
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gable, was owed."212 Thus, even if OSHA requires owners to correct an
independent contractor's violation, Florida law appears not to impose
the same requirement. 2 13  And, as previously stated, OSHA cannot
enlarge a duty that does not exist under Florida law. 2 14 Again, this illus-
trates the unresolved externality of applying OSHA's MED broadly in
tort proceedings as much as in commission proceedings.
In addition to these limitations on an owner's duty, courts have
held that an owner may owe: (1) no duty to provide a safe place to work
or to insure that the work was performed with appropriate safety equip-
212. Skow, 468 So. 2d at 424; see also Baxley v. Dixie Land & Timber Co., 521 So. 2d 170,
172-73 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (interpreting the Price exception to relieve owner of
nondelegable duty as to independent contractor's employee injured while performing inherently
dangerous work based on the independent contractor relationship and the risks necessarily
assumed by such contractor and its employees). But see Orr v. United States, 486 F.2d 270, 277,
277 n.8 (5th Cir. 1973) (limiting Price to cases involving negligent fellow employee of
independent contractor and arguing non-delegable duty owed by owner in a Federal Tort Claims
Act case involving no warning of danger). Although Orr follows a MED philosophy, it is contrary
to Fifth Circuit precedent. See Corban v. Skelly Oil Co., 256 F.2d 775, 780 (5th Cir. 1958)
(finding that the inherently dangerous doctrine has never been extended to permit independent
contractor's employee to recover from principal for breach of a nondelegable duty). Orr also was
decided prior to Florida's interpretations of Price in Lake Parker Mall, Inc. v. Carson, 327 So. 2d
121, 124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) and Skow, 468 So. 2d at 424.
Another, less-often used critique of Price, is that a duty is owed based on § 413 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states, in pertinent part, that
[o]ne who employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer
should recognize as likely to create, during its progress, a peculiar unreasonable risk
of physical harm to others unless special precautions are taken, is subject to liability
for physical harm caused to them by the absence of such precautions ....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 413 (1965). However, Florida follows Price rather than the
Restatement. See Scofi v. McKeon Constr. Co., 666 F.2d 170, 172-73 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating in a
case originating in the Middle District of Florida that "Price sets forth the law of Florida" and
therefore, independent contractors' employees are not considered part of the "others" protected
under the Restatement). The Special Note to Chapter 15 of Tentative Draft No. 7 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts specifically excluded independent contractors' employees from
coverage by this whole family of sections (§§ 410-429). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS CH.
15 (Tentative Draft No. 7, 1962). Although the Special Note was not adopted by the final version,
multiple courts have found it persuasive and have employed it to exclude independent contractors'
employees. See, e.g., King v. Shelby Rural Elec. Coop. Corp., 502 S.W.2d 659, 662-63 (Ky.
1973) (reasoning that the owner already pays the premium for workmen's compensation coverage
and that owner should not be exposed to greater liability than if he hired his own employee to
perform the same work).
213. Lowe v. United States, 466 F. Supp. 895, 899 (M.D. Fla. 1979) (stating that an owner is
not "liable merely because it gained knowledge of a dangerous condition on the jobsite, yet failed
to affirmatively rectify it"; however, an owner is possibly liable if it "affirmatively acts and helps
to create the dangerous condition" (citations omitted)).
214. Cf 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (2006) (stating OSHA does not enlarge common law duties).
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ment,215 (2) no duty even if it gains knowledge of a safety violation, 2 16
and (3) no duty if an independent contractor has superior knowledge.2 17
While Florida courts have delineated the parameters of Price,2 18 they
have yet to address fully the similar issues surrounding OSHA's impact
on the duty owed by a business premises owner.
IV. How STATES ADDRESS AND SHOULD ADDRESS THE
USE OF OSHA IN TORT ACTIONS
To illustrate the confusion that has ensued in light of the MED's
broad application and the effect of OSHA using the MCP to cite a large
swath of employers, unaware of their duty, this Article shows the poten-
tial impacts of OSHA's application in state common law torts actions in
Florida and specifically in the Florida Juice hypothetical.2 1 9
A. Application of OSHA in a State's Common Law Tort Actions
Although no Florida appellate court has yet to address whether in
tort actions OSHA imposes a duty of care on premises owners at mul-
tiemployer worksites, 220 some Florida appellate courts, in dicta, have
discussed OSHA and its relevance regarding premises owners and gen-
215. See Pearson v. Harris, 449 So. 2d 339, 340-41 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (affirming
summary judgment for owner of the tower and contractee when employee of independent
contractor hired to install an antenna on tower fell from tower upon allegedly hearing sniper fire).
While emphasizing the owner's lack of control and supervision, Pearson explained that if the
owner did "provide . . . assistance and did so negligently, causing Pearson's injuries, then liability
could attach." Id. at 344 (citations omitted).
216. See Lowe, 466 F. Supp. at 899 (stating that an owner is not "liable merely because it
gained knowledge of a dangerous condition on the job site, yet failed to affirmatively rectify it";
however, an owner is possibly liable if it "affirmatively acts and helps to create the dangerous
condition." (citations omitted)).
217. See Horton v. Gulf Power Co., 401 So. 2d 1384, 1385 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (holding
owner not liable when scaffolding furnished by owner altered unsafely by independent contractor
and independent contractor had superior knowledge of the unsafe condition). Gulf Power
supposedly disposed of any duty to warn by warning the independent contractor, id.; however,
Gulf Power's agent said he never warned the independent contractor's superintendent. Id. at 1387
(Smith, C.J., concurring.). Thus, based on the court's rationale, the summary judgment for the
owner was because the independent contractor was in control of the scaffold, was aware of the
danger of overloading the scaffold, and had knowledge that was equal, if not superior, to that of
the owner. Id. at 1386 (majority opinion). Regarding superior knowledge, the court cited case law
supporting the principle that "[s]uperior knowledge of the owner/contractee is [the] basis of his
duty to warn." Id. at 1386 n.1 (citations omitted).
218. See supra notes 206-217 and accompanying text.
219. See supra Part II.A (explaining the importance of MCP to this Article's analysis of a
business premises owner's liability in tort actions).
220. A case in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida touched on the issue.
See Int'l Ship Repair & Marine Servs. v. Estate of Morales-Montalvo, No. 8:08-cv-1617-T-
23AEP, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2219, at *13-*14 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 12, 2010) (finding that
independent contractor's employee was not a ship owner's employee in tort and thus not within
the class sought to be protected under an OSHA regulation and holding, while citing Melerine v.
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eral contractors.221
Similar to other jurisdictions,2 2 2 Florida has ruled that OSHA does
not provide the basis for an independent cause of action against employ-
ers or third parties. 223 Florida also has reiterated the rule that OSHA
does not "enlarge or diminish common law or statutory rights, duties, or
liabilities."2 24 Jimenez v. Gulf Western Manufacturing Company further
emphasized that "simply because OSHA is a federal law, it is not dis-
positive on state law questions of negligence." 225 This reasoning has led
Florida courts to declare, "Because OSHA neither enlarges nor dimin-
ishes any statutory or common law rights, its definition" of who may be
deemed an employer is likely irrelevant. 2 26 And if the Act's definition of
employer is likely irrelevant, so too is likely the definition of employer
under Multiemployer Citation Policy ("MCP"), which explicates the
Multiemployer Doctrine ("MED"). 227 Thus, based on Florida's interpre-
tation of OSHA and consistent with other courts' treatment of OSHA
admissibility,228 if an owner owes no duty under Florida law, then
OSHA may not create one. Therefore, if an owner hires an independent
contractor to perform a hazardous occupation, it owes no duty to the
Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 659 F.2d 706, 707 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981), that ship owner's
violation of an OSHA regulation "fails to establish negligence as a matter of law").
221. See infra notes 222-233 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
223. See Cadillac Fairview of Fla., Inc. v. Cespedes, 468 So. 2d 417, 421 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985) (reiterating prior holdings regarding OSHA's inability to create independent causes of
action); see also Jimenez v. Gulf & W. Mfg. Co., 458 So. 2d 58, 60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(citations omitted) (same); Jupiter Inlet Corp. v. Brocard, 546 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1988) (same).
224. Jimenez, 458 So. 2d at 60 (explaining OSHA cannot alter common law regarding
relationship between independent contractor's employee and manufacturer); see also Jupiter Inlet,
546 So. 2d at 2 (explaining that "[s]ection 653(b)(4) of [OSHA] provides that nothing contained
in it shall enlarge, diminish or affect common law or statutory liability of employers with respect
to injuries to or death of an employee arising out of and in the course of employment" (emphasis
added)). Jupiter Inlet extended liability to a landowner for an injury to an independent contractor's
employee because the owner vitiated the independent contractor relationship. See id. at 3. Jupiter
Inlet's treatment of the owner's control is consistent with the Teal test. See Teal v. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 728 F.2d 799, 804 (6th Cir. 1984) (emphasizing control as part of Teal test for
extending OSHA duty to premises owner).
225. Jimenez, 458 So. 2d at 60 n.3.
226. Boatwright v. Sunlight Foods, Inc., 592 So. 2d 261, 263 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
(citations omitted). In Boatwright, the owner committed an affirmative act of negligence when he
disregarded an independent contractor's request for a protective guardrail. Id. at 262, 263.
Regardless of the owner's actions in Boatwright, the court still noted that OSHA cannot be used to
define the employer of an independent contractor's employee when suing a premises owner in
tort. Id. at 263.
227. See Occ. SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., supra note 30.
228. See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text (explaining that if no duty is owed under
state law then OSHA cannot be used as evidence of negligence); see also 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4)
(2006) (stating that OSHA does not enlarge or affect a common law duty).
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independent contractor's employees absent an affirmative act or omis-
sion of negligence or failure to warn of latent danger.229 Although Flor-
ida law seems to endorse this conclusion, a business premises owner and
independent contractor cannot be sure that every Florida court will reach
the same conclusion because as illustrated in previous sections, OSHA's
broad MED and citation scheme provide opportunity for a broad spec-
trum of interpretations of a business premises owner's duty of care with
respect to inherently dangerous occupations.
Florida has also been hesitant to permit OSHA's admission as evidence
of negligence, stating that OSHA violations do not constitute negligence
per se. 2 30 Although Florida courts have previously held as harmless error
the admission of OSHA as evidence,23 1 they have still questioned
OSHA's relevance.2 32 For example, Jupiter Inlet Corp. v. Brocard
stated, "[Admission of OSHA] further points to the troublesome prob-
lem of OSHA regulations in evidence. If OSHA neither enlarges nor
diminishes any statutory common law rights in this case, what possible
relevance could the OSHA definition of employer have?"2 3 3 Similar con-
cerns have arisen regarding admission of other statutes to establish evi-
dence of negligence or standard of care when no duty exists.
As Florida's Second District Court of Appeal has stated, "Violation
of a statute may be evidence of negligence, but such evidence only
becomes relevant to a breach of a standard of care after the law has
imposed a duty of care."2 34 Therefore, under Florida law, even if an
229. See Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Price, 170 So. 2d 293, 296-98 (Fla. 1964) (per curiam).
230. See Cadillac Fairview of Fla., Inc. v. Cespedes, 468 So. 2d 417, 421 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985) (citation omitted) (questioning OSHA's relevance); Jupiter Inlet Corp. v. Brocard, 546 So.
2d 1, 2-3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (citing Florida precedent that an OSHA violation is not
negligence per se). These statements of Florida law are in addition to the rationale offered in
Melerine's holding. See supra Part III.C.
231. See Jupiter Inlet, 546 So. 2d at 3; Cadillac Fairview, 468 So. 2d at 421; Jimenez, 458 So.
2d at 60-61. However, these cases are distinguishable. In Jupiter Inlet, the court determined that
Jupiter Inlet Corporation, a land development company, had an employer-employee relationship
with the independent contractor's construction worker because its level of control vitiated the
employer-independent contractor relationship. Jupiter Inlet, 546 So. 2d at 3. Similarly, in Cadillac
Fairview, by exercising control over the project, the general contractor vitiated the independent
contractor relationship. Cadillac Fairview, 468 So. 2d at 420-21. Finally, Jimenez involved a
product liability action in which industry standards assigned responsibility to the purchaser, so
OSHA admission was harmless. Jimenez, 458 So. 2d at 60-61.
232. See, e.g., Jupiter Inlet, 546 So. 2d at 3. The Florida courts' treatment of the control factor
is consistent with the Teal test's emphasis on control. See Teal v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,
728 F.2d 799, 804 (6th Cir. 1984) (emphasizing control as part of Teal test for extending OSHA
duty to premises owner).
233. Jupiter Inlet, 546 So. 2d at 3 (emphasis added).
234. Estate of Johnson v. Badger Acquisition of Tampa LLC, 983 So. 2d 1175, 1182 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2008) (citation omitted) (affirming summary judgment for pharmaceutical service
provider based on no duty owed in wrongful death action). But see Fla. Standard Jury Instructions,
778 So. 2d 264, 266-67 (Fla. 2000) (stating in "Note on Use" that violation of OSHA is evidence
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owner violated OSHA and the violation could be construed as evidence
of negligence, such evidence may only become relevant to a breach if
the law imposed a duty of care on the owner.235 As stated above, OSHA
does not create a duty when no duty exists under Florida law.236 Without
first establishing a duty, an independent contractor's employee may not
be able to rely on an OSHA violation as evidence of negligence.23 7
Moreover, pursuant to Melerine, an owner, as a third party, owes an
independent contractor's employees no specific duty under OSHA.238
Therefore, an OSHA violation possibly may not be admitted as evidence
of negligence in a tort action by an independent contractor's employee
against a premises owner. However, again, absent a clear MED, out-
comes may vary.
B. Florida Juice Revisited: How Courts Should Address
Future Cases
To illustrate how the doctrines and case law set forth above apply
to state or federal tort actions by an independent contractor's employees
against business premises owners, this Article returns to the issue of
whether Florida Juice owed Bobby a duty of care under OSHA or if a
possible OSHA violation by Florida Juice may be used as evidence of
negligence in the estate's action. By doing so, this Article attempts to
of negligence under Standard Jury Instruction 4.11). First, to support its assertion, the Jury
Instruction cites Jupiter Inlet, but Jupiter Inlet itself questioned the relevance of OSHA as
evidence of negligence and only admitted it because the owner vitiated the independent contractor
relationship. See Jupiter Inlet, 546 So. 2d at 3. Second, based on Estate of Johnson, the OSHA
violation should not be admitted as evidence of negligence if there was no duty owed. Estate of
Johnson, 983 So. 2d at 1182. Because under Florida law, OSHA does not establish a duty owed by
a premises owner to an independent contractor's employee, the jury instruction is inapplicable to
the premises owner. Cf id. (stating there must be a duty before violation of a statute is relevant as
evidence). Estate of Johnson is consistent with other courts' treatment of OSHA. See supra note
61 (discussing OSHA's limitations) and notes 77-79; 81-84 and accompanying text (explaining if
no duty is owed under state law, then OSHA cannot be used as evidence of negligence).
235. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text. Cf Maddox v. Ford Motor Co., No. 94-
4153, 1996 WL 272385, at *3-*4 (6th Cir. May 21, 1996) (stating that if no duty is established
under state common law, OSHA cannot then create a duty); Estate of Johnson, 983 So. 2d at 182
(stating there must be a duty owed before a violation of a statute is relevant as evidence).
236. See Maddox, 1996 WL 272385, at *3-*4 (stating once no duty established under state
common law, OSHA cannot then create a duty); see also supra notes 223-37 and accompanying
text (discussing use of OSHA in Florida). Cf supra note 61 (discussing OSHA's limitations and
accompanying cases) and notes 84-85 and accompanying text (explaining that if no duty is owed
under state law then OSHA cannot be used as evidence of negligence).
237. Duty must precede standard of care; without duty, there is no negligence. Jenkins v. W.L.
Roberts, Inc., 851 So. 2d 781, 783 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (citations omitted); see also SIR
FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTs 468 (13th ed. 1929) ("Proof of negligence in the air, so
to speak, will not do.").
238. Melerine v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 659 F.2d 706, 707 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981)
("While [OSHA regulations] are evidence of a general standard of care due employees, they
establish no standard of care due third persons.").
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illustrate that because OSHA's current MED and MCP are so broad in
application, a court, like a Florida state court for example, may interpret
the doctrine not to be applicable just as much as it could rely on other
persuasive precedent for its applicability. For simplicity, this Article
uses below the example of a Florida state court.
Before addressing OSHA's impact on the estate's claim, a court
must first determine whether Florida Juice breached its limited duties239
under Price2 4 0 and its progeny. Under Price, the issue is whether
Florida Juice, by a negligent act or omission, caused injury to Bobby or
failed to warn Bobby of latent dangers.242 Although OSHA found the
worksite to be unsafe, Florida Juice may argue that there was no evi-
dence that it committed an affirmative act of negligence. Florida Juice
also may argue that it did not commit a negligent omission because its
contract with Independent Electric did not impose an explicit duty on
Florida Juice to monitor, inspect, and correct violations.24 3 Moreover,
Florida Juice may assert that Alderman's progress assessment did not
vitiate the independent contractor relationship, causing Florida Juice to
undertake a duty of care for Bobby. 2 " However, if Alderman's action
went beyond merely assessing the progress, there is potential for liability
to be imposed on Florida Juice.
Additionally, Florida Juice may argue that it did not owe a duty to
provide Bobby with a ladder or safety equipment24 5 even if Florida Juice
required Independent Electric to comply with OSHA standards 246 or
knew of Independent Electric's violation. 247 Again, however, if Florida
Juice did provide Bobby with a ladder or safety equipment, it would owe
him a duty to do so in a non-negligent manner. Thus, under this analysis,
Florida Juice could just as easily not be liable or be liable by a mere
change in one action.
Similar to the situation in Horton v. Gulf Power Co., Independent
Electric and Bobby had superior knowledge because Alderman suppos-
239. The court must address the state law first, so it can determine if OSHA's admission would
enlarge the duty owed. If there is no duty owed, OSHA cannot create one. See Maddox, 1996 WL
272385, at *3-*4.
240. See supra Part III.D.i.
241. See supra Part IH.D.ii.
242. Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Price, 170 So. 2d 293, 298 (Fla. 1964) (per curiam).
243. See Skow v. Dept. of Transp., 468 So. 2d 422, 424 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
244. See id.; see also Calloway v. PPG Indus., Inc., 155 F. App'x 450, 451-52, 455 (11th Cir.
2005) (per curiam) (holding no duty owed by owner to independent contractor's employee who
fell while installing water line); Kaczmarek v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 884 F. Supp. 768, 778
(W.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding owner owed no duty to independent contractor's employee for
ammonia gas exposure during repair because owner lacked requisite control).
245. See Pearson v. Harris, 449 So. 2d 339, 340-41 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
246. See Calloway, 155 F. App'x at 453, 455 (citation omitted).
247. See Lowe v. United States, 466 F. Supp. 895, 899 (M.D. Fla. 1979).
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edly was not versed in electrical repair.24 8 To paraphrase Horton, Florida
Juice was no more required to warn Independent Electric and Bobby
"than a householder is required to warn employees of his roofing con-
tractor about the height of the roof."24 9 Further, Bobby knew that the
generator was energized at the time of the accident.250 Therefore,
besides being an obvious danger associated with electrical repair, Flor-
ida Juice may argue that the energized generator also, arguably, was not
a latent danger, which would have imposed on Florida Juice a duty to
warn.251 However, Bobby's estate may reverse Florida Juice's fortune if
it were to prove Alderman also did have superior knowledge regarding
the generator and did not share this information with Independent
Electric.
Regardless of superior knowledge, some may argue that it is ineq-
uitable to treat Florida Juice as Bobby's employer. Emphasizing eco-
nomic efficiency of contracts, Florida Juice may argue that it already
paid a premium for Bobby's workmen's compensation insurance,
assuming Independent Electric had calculated it as part of its bid
price.25 2 Therefore, Florida Juice may claim that to hold it liable means
it would pay the premium for workmen's compensation insurance with-
out receiving the benefit253 and that if it knew it could be subjected to
greater liability, it could have hired one of its own employees to perform
the work and limited its liability.254 This workers' compensation quan-
dary concerning a business premises owners' liability is a prime exam-
ple of the confusion that ensues from a broad interpretation of the
multiemployer doctrine as illustrated below-an example that possibly
leaves workers like Bobby with no recourse.
Based on the following, Florida Juice may have not owed a duty to
Bobby under Price25 5 and its progeny.256 If no duty was owed under
Florida common law, Florida Juice may argue that OSHA may not
enlarge a duty that does not exist. 257 Thus, under Florida law, it is possi-
248. See Horton v. Gulf Power Co., 401 So. 2d 1384, 1386 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); supra
note 211.
249. Horton, 401 So. 2d at 1387 (Smith, C.J., concurring).
250. See Merritt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 875 F.2d 603, 604 (7th Cir. 1989); Lake Parker
Mall, Inc. v. Carson, 327 So. 2d 121, 123-26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
251. See Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Price, 170 So. 2d 293, 296 (Fla. 1964) (per curiam).
252. See supra text accompanying note 94.
253. See supra text accompanying note 95.
254. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
255. See supra Part III.D.i. Even if Price were to be overruled, Florida Juice still might not be
held liable because it failed to exercise the requisite control that would vitiate the independent
contract relationship and thus creating a duty at common law.
256. See supra Part III.D.ii.
257. See supra notes 164-72 and accompanying text. Cf 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (2006) (stating
that OSHA neither enlarges nor affects the common law duties of employers and employees).
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ble that a business premises owner, satisfying Price, may not be sub-
jected to a tort action by an independent contractor's employee based on
OSHA regulations. 2 58 However, if Price were to be reversed and the
exceptions to the rule of inherently dangerous work doctrine and danger-
ous instrumentality doctrine were no longer applicable, the court may
consider OSHA's MED in its current form to be relevant when deter-
mining Florida Juice's liability, even if Florida Juice was unaware of the
MED and its citation scheme's broad applicability.25 9
Assuming the court considers Teaf26 0 or similar law as persuasive
because Florida's law is unsettled, Florida Juice may still owe no duty to
Bobby. Florida Juice may argue that the estate cannot meet the first
prong of the Teal test because Florida Juice never exercised the requisite
control. 2 6 1 Therefore, OSHA's MED may not be able to be used to
impose a duty of care on Florida Juice.262 If there was no evidence that
Florida Juice exercised control when Alderman visited the worksite and
no evidence that Alderman instructed Independent Electric's workers263
and there was only evidence that Alderman assessed the project's pro-
gress, Florida Juice may have a strong case that it lacked the requisite
control,264 making Teal inapplicable.265 However, if evidence showed
that Florida Juice did exercise the requisite control, it would have
destroyed the independent contractor relationship, thus violating Cantor
v. Cochran2 6 6 and creating a duty under Florida law and thus also under
OSHA. 2 67 Again, this illustrates the unpredictability OSHA's current
MED scheme creates.
If Florida Juice proves that it owed no duty to Bobby under Price
258. If no duty is owed, OSHA cannot create one. See 26 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (2006).
259. For example, a business premises owner may hire an independent contractor to clean
power lines on its property, unaware that OSHA may potentially cite it for violations under MCP
and that the injured independent contractor's employee may use the violation in a subsequent tort
action against the owner. As stated previously, this a major reason why the current MCP is
relevant to this Article's analysis. For a further discussion, see supra Part II.A.
260. Teal v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 728 F.2d 799 (6th Cir. 1984).
261. See id. at 804.
262. See id.
263. See Turner v. Scott Paper Co., No. 94-0284-P-M, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6768, at *3,
*11-*12 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 17, 1995), adopted by, No. 94-0284-P-M, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6769,
at *2 (S.D. Ala. May 18, 1995).
264. See Skow v. Dep't of Transp., 468 So. 2d 422, 424 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
265. Control is a Teal test prerequisite; absent control, Teal is inapplicable. See Teal, 728 F.2d
at 804.
266. Cantor v. Cochran, 184 So. 2d 173, 174-75 (Fla. 1966) (listing control as factor in
determining whether the independent contractor relationship is destroyed); see also supra note
178 and accompanying text (discussing importance of control in Teal test).
267. Cf Jupiter Inlet Corp. v. Brocard, 546 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (finding third
party owed duty when vitiating the independent contractor relationship); Cadillac Fairview of Fla.,
Inc v. Cespedes, 468 So. 2d 417, 420-21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (same).
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or Teal, the court must still determine if an OSHA violation can be used
as evidence of negligence.2 68 Based on cases like Estate of Johnson,
Florida Juice may argue that the court should rule that because no duty
was owed, a regulatory violation cannot be used as evidence of negli-
gence.2 69 As stated previously, this analysis is consistent with other
jurisdictional analysis regarding the admissibility of an OSHA violation
as evidence of negligence.270
Therefore, based on Florida law and other jurisdictional law, it is
possible for a court to conclude that OSHA cannot be used to establish a
duty of care, nor can an OSHA violation be used as evidence of negli-
gence. However, as illustrated above, mere changes in the hypothetical
or a court's interpretation within the broad spectrum of the current MED
and OSHA citation scheme may result in the opposite outcome. Hence,
the reason there is a current state of confusion in tort actions and OSHA
commission proceedings.
V. CONCLUSION
In the 1970s, Congress promulgated the OSH Act to create a safer
working environment for America's workers. Although the Act has led
to safer working conditions, greater protections are still needed in vari-
ous dangerous occupations, as the Bureau of Labor Statistics calculated
a preliminary total of 4,547 fatal work injuries in 2010.21 However, as
this Article illustrates, any further regulations or policy statements
enacted by OSHA must be done with precision in order to avoid the
unintended consequences resulting from policies such as the Multiem-
ployer Citation Policy ("MCP") that were not subject to proper notice
and comment rulemaking. Rather than applying the MED and citations
policies like the MCP (which on their faces are based on the construc-
tion industry-context) to employers in the non-construction industry
context such as Florida Juice, OSHA and its state counterparts, if they
desire to do so, should enact regulations for specific multiemployer
industries through proper notice and comment rulemaking or revise its
MED and MCP through notice and comment rulemaking. By employing
the scalpel, rather than the sledgehammer, regulators can be more pre-
cise in their rulemaking and provide greater clarity for employers hiring
268. See supra Part II.C (discussing use of OSHA as evidence of negligence); supra Part IV.A
(same).
269. See Estate of Johnson v. Badger Acquisition of Tampa LLC, 983 So. 2d 1175, 1182 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
270. See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
271. News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Dep't of Labor, National Census of Fatal
Occupational Injuries in 2010 (Preliminary Results) (Aug. 25, 2011), available at http://bls.gov/
news.release/pdf/cfoi.pdf.
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independent contractors and thus create a safer working environment for
all workers.27 2
Therefore, this Article does not call for the absolving of all business
premises owners from negligent acts but rather for a clarification of their
liability when the business premises owners, who are not engaging in
affirmative acts of negligence, hire independent contractors whose
employees are injured while performing a job deemed a hazardous occu-
pation. Without such clarification, needless litigation and inefficient
allocations of resources may ensue.
Although this Article focuses predominantly on the MED's effect
on the business premises owner, it does recognize that workers, such as
Bobby Roberts, and their families may be without recourse if the inde-
pendent contractor is insolvent and uninsured. This issue merits greater
attention than this Article can provide in this limited space. However,
one possible solution is the strengthening of state Workers' Compensa-
tion Guaranty Funds. To strengthen these funds, states can expand their
application beyond insolvent insurers and self-insurers to apply to situa-
tions involving uninsured employers. For states already addressing the
issue of uninsured employers, they can fortify their existing programs.
To fund this expansion, states may increases penalties for employers
who fail to secure worker's compensation insurance. Additionally, to
encourage more precise or tailored state regulations of multiemployer
worksites, the federal government may earmark unconditional funds to
states that revise their labor laws and regulations to create greater clarity
for employers such as Florida Juice.27 3 States may use these additional
funds to help subsidize stronger Workers Compensation Guaranty
Funds.
Thus, although general rules may be efficient, they may not be rea-
sonable in practice. Through precise regulations tailored to specific
industries and situations and through stronger funding that protects
workers of uninsured independent contractors, one can avoid the nega-
272. Sasser Elec. & Mfg. Co., II BNA OSHC 2133 (No. 82 178, 1984), 1984 WL 34886, at *3
("[l]n many instances it may not be feasible, because of an employer's lack of expertise, or
wasteful, without necessarily resulting in the best achievement of safety for all employees, to
require the contracting employer to duplicate the safety efforts of the specialist.").
273. For examples of states addressing the effects of uninsured employer, one can review the
Pennsylvania, Alaska, and New Mexico models. See 77 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2702 (2011); STATE OF
ALASKA, Div. OF WORKERS' COMP., Workers' Compensation Benefit Guaranty Fund, http://
labor.alaska.gov/wc/benefit-guaranty.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2011); STATE OF N.M., WORKERS
Comp. ADMIN., Uninsured Employers' Fund, http://www.workerscomp.state.nm.us/partners/uef
php (last visited Nov. 25, 2011). This proposed scheme is similar to the Department of
Education's "Race to the Top" program. See Race to the Top Assessment Program, Dep't OF
EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop-assessment/index.html (last visited Nov. 25,
2011).
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tive externalities of the Florida Juice hypothetical. Until such regulatory
reform ensues, the Eleventh Circuit, as a court yet to address directly the
MED in a binding decision, is in a prime position to provide clarity in
this area of murky laws, doctrines, and policy statements and provide a
spark to encourage OSHA to reconsider its MED policies and MCP.
